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THE COURTS AND NATIONAL SECURITY: THE ORDEAL 
OF THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE 
David Rudenstine* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of World War II and the emergence of what are 
popularly termed the "Imperial Presidency"l and the "National 
Security State,,,2 the Supreme Court has, in one decision after 
another, shaped numerous legal doctrines that insulate the Executive 
from meaningful judicial oversight in cases the Executive claims 
implicate national security.3 In those decisions, the courts have 
utilized a variety of legal techniques to restrict or totally prohibit 
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Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. gave a broad currency to the phrase the "Imperial 
Presidency" in his frequently cited 1973 study entitled The Imperial Presidency. 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY (1973). For a more recent 
study invoking the same phrase, see Charlie Savage, Takeover: The Return of the 
Imperial Presidency and the Subversion of American Democracy (2007). 
Garry Wills utilized the popular phrase in the title of a recent book, Bomb Power: The 
Modern Presidency and the National Security State. GARRY WILLS, BOMB POWER: 
THE MODERN PRESIDENCY AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (2010). Dana Priest 
and William M. Arkin provided a slight modification of this popular term in their 
recent book, entitled Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security 
State. DANA PRIEST & WILLIAM M. ARKIN, Top SECRET AMERICA: THE RISE OF THE 
NEW AMERICAN SECURITY STATE (2011). 
See generally David Rudenstine, The Irony of a Faustian Bargain: A Reconsideration 
of the Supreme Court's 1953 United States v. Reynolds Decision, 34 CARDOZO L. 
REv. 1283, 1287-88 & nn.13-18, 1391 & n.525 (2013) (explaining that the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Reynolds was a major pillar of the Age of Deference, which 
has resulted in the "insulation of the executive from meaningful judicial 
accountability and review, a distortion in the checks and balances governmental 
scheme, the denial of a judicial remedy to those allegedly harmed by executive branch 
conduct, and the undermining of the rule oflaw"). 
Justice Sutherland wrote a pre-World War II opinion of unusual importance in the 
development of the Age of Deference in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export 
Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 329 (1936). 
37 
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For example, courts have relied upon the executive privilege,S the 
state secrets privilege,6 standing requirements,7 pleading rules,s the 
qualified immunity doctrine,9 as well as the requirements for a 
meritorious claim for relief'° to dismiss cases from the courts. 
Woven together these doctrines create a protective shield surrounding 
the Executive that gives rise to what I have termed the Age of 
Deference. II 
Serious consequences have resulted from this seventy-year era of 
deference. 12 An individual arguably denied a vested right by 
executive branch officials is denied judicial relief. 13 Executive 
5. The foundational case for a constitutionally based executive privilege is United States 
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). 
6. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953), announced the contemporary state 
secrets privilege. For two recent lower court opinions substantially extending the rule 
in Reynolds, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1081-84 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011) and El-Masri v. United 
States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007). The controversial 
state secrets privilege seems now disfavored by the Executive and the courts, which, 
as a result, have utilized other doctrines-such as no claim for relief, standing rules, 
pleading rules-to dismiss a case (or party) implicating national security. See 
Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1288, 1391 n.525. 
7. See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013). On June 16, 
2014, the Supreme Court distinguished Clapper in Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 
134 S. Ct. 2334, 2347 (2014). In the Susan B. Anthony List case, the Court granted 
standing to a party seeking to enjoin government officials from enforcing the law, on 
the grounds that the law in question violated limits established by the First 
Amendment. Id. Although the case did not in any way implicate national security, it 
is noteworthy that the Court concluded that the plaintiffs had a sufficient injury to 
satisfy the constitutional requirements for standing. Id. at 2343. 
8. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 683 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
9. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011). 
10. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 
3409 (2010). 
11. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1287. 
12. Id. at 1288. 
13. See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1084 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (affirming the dismissal of plaintiffs' claims alleging torture and 
degrading treatment by federal officials), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Arar, 
585 F.3d at 627 (Pooler, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, the majority concludes that the 
Constitution provides Arar no remedy for this wrong, that the judiciary must stay its 
hand in enforcing the Constitution because untested national security concerns have 
been asserted by the Executive branch."); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 
313 (4th Cir.) ("[T]he state secrets privilege imposes a heavy burden on the party 
against whom the privilege is asserted . . .. That party loses access to evidence that 
he needs to prosecute his action and, if privileged state secrets are sufficiently central 
to the matter, may lose his cause of action altogether."), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 
(2007);' ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 687 (6th Cir. 2007) (dismissing plaintiffs' 
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branch officials who may have committed unlawful acts that have 
violated an individual's constitutional rights escape judicial 
accountability for their actions. 14 The structural checks and balances 
scheme central to the constitutional distribution of power is 
undermined by the failure of the courts to exercise meaningful review 
in national security cases. 15 Because this deference encourages 
executive officials to expect that they will not be held accountable for 
their conduct, this deference permits, if not encourages, executive 
officials to prospectively overlook or ignore their obligation to adhere 
to legal norms. 16 Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded when 
the courts dismiss actions because of the alleged need for secrecy in 
actions in which a plaintiff alleges egregious violations of law. 17 The 
nation's fundamental ideal of preserving and strengthening the 
national commitment to the rule of law is betrayed by the very 
governing institution-the courts-primarily charged with preserving 
and strengthening the ideal. 18 More generally, because the 
constitutional order is premised not just on a doctrine of separation of 
powers among the three co-equal branches of government,19 but on a 
claims based on standing and holding that "even to the extent that additional evidence 
may exist, which might establish standing . . . discovery of such evidence would, 
under the circumstances of this case, be prevented by the States Secrets Doctrine"); 
Halkin v. Helms (Halkin I), 598 F.2d I, 3-5 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (determining that the 
states secrets privilege prevents the NSA from having to admit or deny the warrantless 
acquisition of plaintiffs' international communications). 
14. See cases cited supra note 13. 
15. For cases in which the courts exercise meaningful judicial review in national security 
cases and thus advance the important function of checks and balances, see Hamdi v. 
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004), New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713, 714 (1971) (per curiam), and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel 
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,585 (1952). One scholar recently summed up the checks and 
balances dynamic built into the constitutional scheme as follows: 
[James] Madison is generally credited as the lead architect of our 
constitutional design. Animated by his vision of checks and 
balances, the founders prescribed an intricate network of new 
institutions, all holding the others to account through carefully 
distributed powers and chosen through a variety of different 
methods designed to prevent anyone faction from dominating. 
PETER M. SHANE, MADISON'S NIGHTMARE: How EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 2 (2009). 
16. See SHANE, supra note 15, at 3. 
17. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 630 (Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
18. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1370. 
19. See generally INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 957-58 (1983) (upholding the doctrine of 
separation of powers by concluding that the congressional veto that allowed one 
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complicated system of checks and balances20 that assumes that the 
Executive will not be "above the law,,,21 this Age of Deference 
contributes to the potential collapse of the constitutional order. 
Central to the Age of Deference is the state secrets privilege,22 and 
because it is so emblematic of the entire era, a study of the 
contemporary state secrets privilege sheds considerable light on the 
broader and highly significant theme of the judicial function in 
national security cases since World War II.23 This Article assesses 
the contemporary state secrets privilege.24 In so doing, it outlines the 
House of Congress to override a decision by the executive branch under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional). 
20. See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 699 (1997) (describing the three branches of 
government as "a self-executing safeguard against the encroachment or 
aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other"); see also United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) ("[D]eciding whether a matter has in any measure 
been committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a 
delicate exercise .... ") (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211 (1962». 
21. See Clinton, 520 U.S. at 696; Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706. 
22. The state secrets privilege is a common law rule of evidence that courts have enforced 
to protect national security secrets. See infra Part I; see also, Rudenstine, supra note 
3, at 1371-72. For a selection of recent law review articles on state secrets, see 
Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009), 
for a discussion of the deference granted by courts to matters of national security; 
Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1249 (2007) [hereinafter Limits of National Security Litigation], 
for a discussion of the origin and evolution of the state secret privilege leading up to 
its use in 2007 by the Bush Administration; Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State 
Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REv. 77 (2010), for a discussion of the practical implications of 
the state secrets doctrine for private and public actors in cases moving through the 
courts between 2001-2009; Amanda Frost, The State Secrets Privilege and 
Separation of Powers, 75 FORDHAM L. REv. 1931 (2007), for a discussion of the 
importance of checks and balances to limit the abuse of the state secrets privilege; 
Beth George, Note, An Administrative Law Approach to Reforming the State Secrets 
Privilege, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1691 (2009), for a discussion of the advantages of 
administrative law to limiting or curbing the use of the state secret privilege; Carrie 
Newton Lyons, The State Secrets Privilege: Expanding Its Scope Through 
Government Misuse, II LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 99 (2007), for a discussion of 
changes that have happened to state secret jurisprudence since Reynolds; Christina E. 
Wells, State Secrets and Executive Accountability, 26 CaNST. COMMENT. 625, 630-31 
(2010), for a discussion of the use of the state secret privilege under the Obama 
Administration. 
23. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1391. 
24. See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1267 n.113 (sampling of 
critical commentary of the state secrets privilege). For two highly controversial cases 
discussing the states secrets privilege, see Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 
F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) and El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th CiT. 2007). 
These cases generated very critical press commentary. See Editorial, Security Secrets 
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privilege announced by the Supreme Court in United States v. 
Reyriolds/5 which set forth the foundational guidelines for the 
contemporary privilege;26 it maps the expansion of the robust and 
sweeping contemporary privilege and relates that expansion to the 
much narrower privilege announced in Reynolds/7 it assesses the 
consequences of the contemporary privilege;28 it recommends 
changes in the privilege and addresses the impact of those 
recommended changes on national security;29 and finally, it opens a 
useful window on the much broader subject of the role of courts in 
cases implicating national security.30 
and Justice; Why New Laws are Needed to Govern Sensitive Lawsuits Against the 
Government, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,2010, at AI4 ("The case [Jeppesen] again points 
out the need for a new law to govern cases in which national security secrets are 
involved."); Editorial, The ACLU is Dismissed, WALL ST. J., Sept. II, 2010, at AI2 
("Nor will the ACLU find much solace in the Obama Administration, which has 
largely preserved the antiterror legal regime established by its predecessor even as it 
has tinkered with some of the language."); Editorial, Too Many Secrets, N.Y. TiMES, 
Mar. 10, 2007, at AI2 ("It is a challenge to keep track of all the ways the Bush 
Administration is eroding constitutional protections, but one that should get more 
attention is its abuse of the state secrets doctrine."); Editorial, Too Much Privilege, 
L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2009, at A26 (stating that the Obama Administration's decision 
to assert the state secrets privilege was "gravely disappoint[ing]" and urging the Ninth 
Circuit judges to allow the Jeppesen "case [to] proceed so that these alleged victims of 
U.S. mistreatment can make their case in court"); Editorial, Torture Gets a Free Pass, 
Bas. GLOBE, Sept. 19, 2010, at K8 ("This standard is far too sweeping, because 
there's a way to honor both the government's need for secrecy and plaintiffs' rights to 
have their allegations heard."); Editorial, Torture is a Crime, Not a Secret, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 9, 2010, at A30 ("The state secrets doctrine is so blinding and powerful 
that it should be invoked only when the most grave national security matters are at 
·stake .... It should not be used to defend against allegations that if true ... would be 
'gross violations of the norms of international law. "'); see also Khaled EI-Masri, 
Editorial, [Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 3, 2007, at A19. 
25. 345 U.S. 1(1953). 
26. See infra Part I. 
27. See infra Part II. 
28. See infra Part III. 
29. See infra Part IV. For a review and discussion of the legislative proposals to 
Congress, see Jessica Slattery Karich, Restoring Balance to Checks and Balances: 
Checking the Executive's Power Under the State Secrets Doctrine, Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 114 W. VA. L. REv. 759, 779 (2012). Karich entitIes a 
section "Proposed Legislative Reforms to the State Secrets Doctrine." [d.; see also 
Emily Berman, Executive Privilege Disputes Between Congress and the President: A 
Legislative Proposal, 3 ALB. GOV'TL. REv. 741, 750 (2010). 
30. See infra Part IV. 
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In summary, this Article puts forth several claims. The Supreme 
Court's 1953 Reynolds31 decision set forth a set of doctrinal rules that 
still guide the application of the state secrets privilege.32 Those rules 
had no antecedents in United States law3 and thus were not a 
restatement of previously announced state secrets rules.34 Instead, the 
Court in Reynolds fashioned them out of whole cloth. Moreover, the 
contemporary state secrets privilege is not a necessary extraction 
from Reynolds,35 nor are the rules comprising the contemporary state 
secrets privilege mandated by the Constitution or statute. In other 
words, the robust and sweeping rules constituting the contemporary 
privilege are now as much a product of judicial discretion by 
comparison to the Reynolds decision as the rules announced in 
Reynolds were by comparison to earlier state secrets decisions. Thus, 
just as the Reynolds rules constituted a departure from prior state 
secrets cases, the contemporary state secrets rules are a departure 
from Reynolds.36 And just as Reynolds both reflected and nurtured 
the Age of Deference, so do the rules of the contemporary state 
secrets privilege. 
Although the Supreme Court generally initiates and charts the 
course of important legal doctrine,37 this was not the case in the 
development of the contemporary state secrets privilege. Instead, the 
circuit courts chartered the boundaries of the contemporary privilege 
in a handful of decisions,38 with the Supreme Court assuming a 
mainly passive role either because a party did not petition for 
certiorari or the Court denied it when review was sought. 39 But now 
31. 345 U.S. I (1953). 
32. See, e.g., Fazaga v. FBI, 884 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (applying 
Reynolds by dismissing plaintiffs' claims against the FBI based on the state secrets 
doctrine). 
33. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1363-65. 
34. See infra Part I. 
35. See infra Part II. 
36. Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1365; see also infra Part II. 
37. ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT: MYTH AND REALITY 6 (1978). 
38. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, 776 F.2d 1236 (4th Cir. 1985); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 
709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1038 (1987); Halkin v. Helms 
(Halkin II), 690 F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 
F.2d 268 (4th Cir. 1980); Halkin 1,598 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
39. In addition to the circuit court decisions that initially defined the contemporary 
privilege, the Supreme Court has had numerous opportunities post-September II to 
revisit the state secrets doctrine. However, in these instances, the Court has either 
denied certiorari or no appeal has been sought after the circuit court decision. See 
United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467,520 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 
525 (2012); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en bane), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); Doe v. CIA, 576 F.3d 95, 101-
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that these rules have been in place for decades with occasional 
Supreme Court affirmation,40 it would seem that only the Supreme 
Court has the authority to modify them substantially. 
Because the state secrets privilege drew intense attention after 
September 11 as never before,41 it may be assumed that the 
02 (2d Cir. 2009); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574-76 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010); United States v. Stewart, 590 F.3d 93, 131 (2d Cir. 
2009), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 54 (2013); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 79 (2d 
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1107 (2009); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 
296,302-03 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007); In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 
139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Al-Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1202 
(9th Cir. 2007); Marriott Int'l Resorts v. United States, 437 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 
2006); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 342-43 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 
1093 (2006). See also infra app. 3 and the summary of the Supreme Court decisions 
that follow in tbl.4. 
40. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906 (2011); Tenet 
v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1,8-10 (2005); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988). 
41. See infra app. 1, tbIs.1 & 2; app. 2, tb1.3. One scholar summarized the development 
as follows: 
State secrets doctrine catapulted to prominence post-200!, as the 
executive responded to lawsuits alleging a range of constitutional 
and human rights violations by refusing to disclose information 
during discovery and, in some cases, requesting dismissal of suits 
altogether on national security grounds. More than 120 law 
review articles followed, and media outlets became outspoken in 
their criticism of the privilege. In both the Senate and the House, 
new bills sought to codify what had previously been a common 
law doctrine. And in September 2009, the Attorney General 
introduced new procedures for review and created a State Secrets 
Review Committee. 
Donohue, supra note 22, at 78-79 (footnotes omitted). This increased attention to 
Reynolds and the state secrets doctrine can be attributed to the number of national 
security cases reviewed by district and circuit courts post-September II. While the 
amount of district court cases citing to Reynolds spiked in the period from the mid-
1970s to early-1980s, since 2001, the number of district courts citing to Reynolds has 
been steadily rising. See infra app. I, tbl.I. While in smaller amounts, the number of 
circuit courts citing to Reynolds mirrors the district courts, with slight spikes of 
increased citations to Reynolds during the late-1970s and early-1980s, but then more 
steady and increased attention post-2000 (in particular, the amount of circuit court 
citations to Reynolds increases most consistently after 2003). See infra app. 1, tb1.2. 
Consider also the scant scholarly commentary regarding the state secrets doctrine 
prior to September 11. See infra app. 2, tb1.3. In the 47 year period from 1953 to 
2000, only approximately 250 articles were published citing to Reynolds (an average 
of 5.3 articles per year). In 1999, for instance, only 16 law review articles cited to 
Reynolds. However, following September 11, the heightened attention surrounding 
national security generated much more scholarly commentary on the state secrets 
doctrine. During the 12 year period from 2001 to 2013, approximately 315 law 
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contemporary privilege became what it is today only after that epoch 
defining moment. But such a view would be a misconception. The 
courts of appeals defined the contemporary privilege in the 1970s and 
1980s42 and those rules continue to form the framework for the 
contemporary privilege. And although a few judicial decisions in the 
last few decades have made some alterations in those doctrinal 
ru1es,43 those changes were comparatively minor by comparison to 
the rules set forth by the courts of appeals in their earlier decisions.44 
Nonetheless, although the contours of the state secrets privilege 
were in place for two decades before September 11, there is no 
question that the post-September 11 state secrets decisions have 
drawn extensive attention.45 This is not, however, because the 
privilege expanded. Rather, it is because courts applied the privilege 
to the highly controversial extraordinary rendition cases that arose 
after September 11. Those cases not only created dissension among 
judges but attracted substantial public attention.46 
While the national debate over extraordinary rendition did drive the 
state secrets privilege into the center of the stage,47 it would be a 
misjudgment to assume that the privilege will become less robust and 
sweeping once the intensity of the War on Terror diminishes. That is 
so because the current privilege pre-dated September 1148 and the 
same considerations that generated the privilege also generated th~ 
other doctrines that compose the Age of Deference. Thus, the 
review articles cited to Reynolds (an average of 26.25 articles per year). In 2009, the 
amount of articles citing to Reynolds spiked to 45. 
42. See infra Part II.A. 
43. Compare Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11 (holding that in camera proceedings for the purpose of 
determining whether the privilege applies are insufficient to accord the "absolute 
protection" required), with Molero v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1984) 
(determining validity of privilege claim based on in camera affidavit). 
44. See infra Part II.A. 
45. See infra app. 1, tbls.1 & 2; app. 2, tb1.3; see also Mohamed V. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 
(2011); EI-Masri V. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 
947 (2007); Arar V. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287 (E.D.N.Y. 2006), cert. denied, 
560 U.S. 978 (2010). 
46. See supra note 24. 
47. See Frank Askin, Secret Justice and the Adversary System, 18 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
745 (1991); Timothy Bazzle, Shutting the Courthouse Doors: Invoking the State 
Secrets Privilege to Thwart Judicial Review in the Age o/Terror, 23 GEO. MASON U. 
CIV. RTS. L.J. 29 (2012); John P. Blanc, A Total Eclipse 0/ Human Rights-Illustrated 
by Mohamed V. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1089 (2012); D.A. 
Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets 
Privilege, 63 ALA. L. REv. 429 (2012); Frost, supra note 22, at 1931. 
48. See supra notes 25-26. 
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privilege and the Age of Deference are intertwined, and courts are 
unlikely to restructure the privilege before they are willing to 
reconsider the underpinnings of the Age of Deference, and as of now, 
courts have not signaled any such reconsideration.49 
Although the scope of the privilege will not likely be altered before 
judges are willing to rethink the Age of Deference, the privilege will 
likely be invoked less frequently in future cases than it has been in 
the past because both the Executive and the courts, in the wake of the 
controversy over extraordinary rendition, seem to disfavor the 
privilege. 50 As a result, a favored evidentiary privilege expanded to 
protect the nation's security ironically has become a threat to the 
nation's rule-of-law ideal, thus compromising its utility and making it 
a legal doctrine of last resort5! in an effort to insulate the Executive 
from meaningful judicial accountability.52 
However, the disfavoring of the privilege does not mean that the 
judiciary will hold the Executive more accountable in national 
security cases in the future than it has in the past. Courts have used 
numerous legal doctrines53 to construct a "balloon" that insulates the 
Executive from meaningful judicial review in cases the Executive 
asserts implicate the nation's security. When the scope of one 
doctrine that constitutes the balloon of insulation is diminished--or 
squeezed to follow through with the imagery-in the expectation of 
increasing meaningful judicial review of the Executive, the effect is 
that the displaced air merely enlarges the balloon at some other place. 
This broadening of some other legal doctrine-such as standing or 
pleading rules-thus serves to preserve the insulation of the 
Executive. Built into the Age of Deference is a balloon effect the 
consequence of which is that the Executive's insulation is more or 
less constant no matter what modification may be made to anyone 
doctrine that comprises the Age of Deference. 
Nonetheless, the balloon effect should not dampen efforts to reform 
the state secrets privilege. The current privilege denies arguably 
wronged individuals judicial relief, erodes checks and balances 
essential to the constitutional scheme, fails to hold the Executive 
49. See cases cited supra notes 6 & 39. 
50. See infra notes 107-109 and accompanying text. 
51. See infra note 108. 
52. But see Donohue, supra note 22, at 215-16 ("[T]he use of the state secrets privilege is 
not going to subside."). Because Professor Donohue's research for this article ceased 
in 2008 or 2009, it is possible that the turnabout mentioned above in the text had not 
yet taken hold. 
5 3. See supra notes 5-10. 
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accountable for unlawful conduct, undermines the national 
commitment to the rule of law, and threatens the legitimacy of the 
jUdiciary.54 Moreover, not only is the robust and sweeping 
contemporary privilege unnecessary to the preservation of the 
nation's security, it may well diminish that security because it 
compromises important national values, which are arguably vital to 
the "soft-power" of the United States that contributes to its influence 
around the globe. Accordingly, guidelines for restructuring the 
privilege are set forth below and the consequences of that 
restructuring for national security are assessed. 
Lastly, this study contends that the frame of mind that has 
generated the state secrets privilege is the same mind set that has 
defined and sustained the Age of Deference. It is a mindset not only 
committed to deference, but one that seems profoundly certain of its 
correctness. 55 As a result, it is a mindset that has transformed a 
nuanced disposition favoring deference into an extreme one that 
resists intellectual engagement. Thus, the judiciary will not rethink 
the state secrets privilege and its overall role in national security 
cases until it is willing to rethink the underpinnings of deference. 56 
Although such a rethinking is theoretically possible, it is unlikely to 
occur in the near future because, as Circuit Judge Richard A. Posner 
has noted: "Conservative judges are particularly unlikely to resist 
claims of national security-and the federal judiciary may be more 
conservative today than at any other time in the last half century.,,57 
Until judges are intellectually open to reexamining the premises 
underlying deference, the state secrets privilege and the other 
doctrines that comprise the Age of Deference will continue to 
undermine the judiciary's capacity to provide relief to injured 
individuals, hold the Executive legally accountable, and make good 
on the nation's fundamental ideal-that it is a nation under law. 
54. See infra notes 254-266 and accompanying text. 
55. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
56. See infra Part III. 
57. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY 9-10 (2006). For a report disclosing how Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
Jr. has exercised his authority to appoint conservative judges to the secret court 
established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and, thus, has enhanced the 
deferential posture of the court so that, in the words of one commentator, the judges 
may be "unduly accommodating to government requests," see Charlie Savage, 
Roberts's Picks Reshaping Secret Surveillance Court, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/07 /26/us/politics/robertss-picks-reshaping -secret-
surveillance-court.html and Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Access to Government 
Information is a Foundation of American Democracy-But the Courts Don't Get It, 
65 OKLA. L. REv. 645 (2013). 
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I. THE REYNOLDS PRIVILEGE 
In order to take the full measure of the judicially engineered 
expansion of the state secrets privilege, it is necessary to define the 
baseline established by the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in United 
States v. Reynolds.58 That decision announced for the first time in the 
history of the United States a set of rules that federal courts must 
follow in adjudicating cases in which the executive branch claims the 
state secrets privilege59 and those rules continue to this day to provide 
a skeleton for the contemporary state secrets privilege.60 
The Court stated that only the government may assert the privilege 
and that it should not be "lightly invoked.,,61 Moreover, the privilege 
must be asserted "by the head of the department which has control 
over the matter" and then only after the department head has had 
"actual personal consideration" of the matter.62 The Court stressed 
that a "court itself must determine whether the circumstances are 
appropriate for the claim of privilege,,,63 and that "[j]udicial control 
over the evidence in a case cannot be abdicated to the caprice of 
executive officers.,,64 The Court also stated that a court must try to 
decide whether the privilege should be sustained "without forcing a 
disclosure of the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.,,65 To 
accomplish the twin goals of the Court assuring that it does not 
abdicate control over the evidence to the "caprice of executive 
officers,,,66 while not requiring the disclosure of the sensitive 
information, the Court stated the following guideline: 
It may be possible to satisfy the court, from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the 
privilege is appropriate, and the court should not jeopardize 
the security which the privilege is meant to protect by 
58. 345 U.S. 1,7-10 (1953). 
59. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1366-68. 
60. Id. at 1389-91. 
61. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7. 
62. Id. at 7-8. 
63. Id. at 8. 
64. Id. at 9-10. 
65. Id. at 8. 
66. Id. at 9-10 
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insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the 
judge alone, in chambers.67 
Lastly, the Court concluded that once a judge was convinced that 
"military secrets are at stake,,,68 the privilege must be sustained no 
matter how necessary and vital the information may be to the party 
seeking access to it or how directly relevant the information may be 
to matters of general public importance.69 
The Supreme Court in Reynolds characterized the privilege as 
"well established.,,70 Though the doctrine certainly had historical 
roots, which supported the claim that it was well established, the 
privilege had been invoked only rarely and the few reported decisions 
concerning the privilege were commercial cases between private 
parties, and then mainly patent cases.71 Thus, in support of its claim 
that the state secrets privilege was "well established," the Supreme 
Court cited only five cases,72 only one of which was a decision of the 
Supreme Court-Totten v. United States,73 the so-called Totten 
case-in which the government did not assert a state secrets privilege 
and the Supreme Court did not even mention the privilege, let alone 
67. Id. at 10. 
68. Id. at 11. 
69. Id. See Chesney, supra note 22, at 1377-78, for a transcript of Hepting v. AT&T 
Corp., 539 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008), which details an exchange between a 
Circuit Judge and a Deputy Solicitor General in a case involving an alleged state 
secret in which the line separating judicial "abdication" of its responsibility to 
exercise some review over the Executive's claim that certain information qualified 
under the privilege from judicial expressions of "utmost deference" is invisible. 
70. 345 U.S. at 6-7. 
71. Id. at 2-3, 6-7 n.ll (commercial); Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203, 204 
(E.D.N.Y. 1949) (commercial); Bank Line, Ltd. v. United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588 
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) (commercial), mandamus denied, 163 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1947); 
Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 26 F. Supp. 583, 583-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) (patent); 
Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 F. 353, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1912) 
(patent). 
72. The earlier state secrets cases did not establish the rules set forth in Reynolds. See 
generally Cresmer, 9 F.R.D. at 204 (granting plaintiffs motion to produce 
government report of air flight investigation because there was no "showing of a war 
secret, or secret in respect to munitions of war, or any secret appliance used by the 
armed force, or any threat to the National security"); Bank Line, Ltd., 68 F. Supp. at 
588 (rejecting the claim of privilege because there was no threat to national security 
involved); Pollen, 26 F. Supp. at 584-86 (finding the documents privileged because 
"disclosure would be detrimental to the national defense"); Firth Sterling Steel Co., 
199 F. at 353-56 (finding the evidence was privileged on the grounds of public policy 
since the contents contained military secrets). 
73. 92 U.S. 105 (1875). 
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utilize it as a basis for the decision.74 Thus, though the general idea 
of a privilege did have historical roots, the detailed rules the Court 
announced in Reynolds did not; those rules were crafted by the Court 
and announced in Reynolds for the fIrst time. 75 
In thinking about the Reynolds rules in light of the contemporary 
state secrets privilege, several points are worth emphasizing. . First, 
although the Reynolds rules tilted in different directions-rules 
emphasizing that courts must maintain control over the application of 
the rules of evidence and guard against Executive abuse of the 
privilege, and rules directing courts to be so deferential to the 
Executive's claims as to sustain the privilege in some cases without 
reviewing the disputed document-within a few decades the circuit 
courts effectively eliminated the doctrinal tension these opposing tilts 
generated by effectively granting the Executive de facto absolute 
control over whether disputed information or documents were 
covered by the privilege.76 Second, the Reynolds rule made the 
privilege absolute in nature,77 meaning that once a court decided that 
the disputed information or documents were covered by the privilege, 
the privilege must be sustained no matter how comparatively 
unimportant the threatened injury to national security might be or 
how signifIcant the information might be to the allegedly injured 
74. Id. at 107. 
75. Professor Laura K. Donohue argues that with few exceptions, scholars, either before 
or after the Supreme Court's 1953 decision in Reynolds, have not discussed "~he 
history of state secrets in depth," and that failure has resulted in the "proliferation of 
an Athena-like theory of state secrets: in 1953 it sprung from Zeus's forehead, with 
little or no previous articulation." See Donohue, supra note 22, at 82-83. There is an 
important difference between acknowledging that the common law evidentiary rule 
authorizing a state secrets privilege had a history to it in both the United Statt;S and the 
United Kingdom-a history that certainly meant that the Court in Reynolds did not 
invent the concept of a state secret-and the claim that the detailed and convoluted 
rules announced in Reynolds had no antecedents in the United States. The only prior 
case that seems to have influenced Chief Justice Vinson's shaping of the rules in 
Reynolds was a House of Lords decision: Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co" [1942] 
AC. 624 (H.L.), and the influence of that opinion on the Supreme Court's ruling was 
limited. Thus, from this perspective, and employing Professor Donohue's language, 
Vinson's rules in Reynolds did indeed spring from "Zeus's forehead, with little or no 
previous articulation." For a detailed discussion of the Reynolds decision and the 
relationship between the Reynolds and the Duncan cases, see Rudenstine, supra note 
3, at 1363-66, 1381. 
76. See infra Part II.A. 
77. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1371-72. 
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party. 78 Third, the Court in Reynolds applied the privilege 
retrospectively to specific and concrete Air Force documents-an 
investigation report into a plane crash and three witness statements-
and although the Court sustained the privilege, it still permitted the 
case to move forward, which ultimately meant that the plaintiffs were 
given an opportunity to satisfy their evidentiary burdens with 
evidence otherwise available to them.79 And lastly, the Court in 
Reynolds understood the privilege to be a common law rule of 
evidence and not a constitutionally mandated privilege.80 
II. THE CONTEMPORARY PRIVILEGE 
As noted, the Court in Reynolds gave the Executive de facto control 
over what information was covered by the privilege;8\ made the 
privilege absolute in character;82 applied the privilege retrospectively 
to documents already identified;83 and, although the Court sustained 
the privilege in Reynolds, it permitted the action to move forward, 
thus effectively treating the privileged evidence as if a witness had 
died.84 Without doubt, the Reynolds outcome constituted a major 
victory for government efforts to expand the veil of secrecy. 
Nonetheless, the Court in Reynolds did not suggest that the privilege 
could be properly used to shield unlawful conduct, or information 
that was innocuous or harmless, or that a ruling sustaining the 
privilege should result in the dismissal of an action in which a 
plaintiff claimed that it could satisfy the evidentiary burden without 
relying on privileged evidence.85 But that is what the contemporary 
privilege became in the 1970s and the 1980s; indeed, it became much 
more than that. 
A. Chronological Arc of Expansion 
During the years following the Reynolds decision the state secrets 
privilege attracted some, but limited, attention from the courts and 
78. The Reynolds rules invite abuse that courts fail to perceive. Thus, not only was the 
privilege abused in Reynolds itself, but the highly influential opinion in Halkin II 
reaffirmed the error of the Reynolds Court and concluded that the disputed documents 
in Reynolds contained military secrets. Halkin II, 690 F.2d 977, 990 n.53 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) ("Reynolds itself involved a military secret."). 
79. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 4-5, 11-12 (1953). 
80. Id. at 6-7. 
81. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1371. 
82. Id. 
83. 345 U.S. at 3-5. 
84. !d. at 11-12. 
85. See supra Part l. 
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legal scholars until the presidency of Richard Nixon,86 at which point 
several factors combined to bring about a change.87 The executive 
branch began to assert the state secrets privilege more frequently in 
cases in which individuals claimed that government officials had 
violated their constitutional rights and, perhaps, federal criminal 
law.88 In seeking protection from legal claims based on alleged 
misconduct by executive officials, the executive branch argued for a 
much broader state secrets privilege than previously authorized by 
the Supreme Court.89 Lower federal courts favorably responded to 
such assertions of the privilege and expanded the scope of the state 
secrets privilege well beyond the narrower parameters set forth by the 
Supreme Court in Reynolds,90 and that expanded privilege provided a 
springboard for the executive branch to assert the state secrets 
privilege even more frequently than it previously had and to request a 
still broader and more robust state secrets privilege. This dynamic 
provided courts with opportunities to expand the privilege even 
further. As they did so, the privilege became a more potent weapon 
for the Executive to utilize91 and, as the cases expanding the privilege 
increased in number and scope, the mounting precedent made it that 
much more difficult for judges to rule against the Executive's 
assertion of the privilege. That pattern continued until the end of the 
twentieth century92 and then intensified after September 11.93 
The result is a sweeping privilege, which vastly expanded the 
boundaries of the privilege so that what was initially an evidentiary 
privilege with limited boundaries became a dynamic and powerful 
weapon that the executive branch could use to dismiss lawsuits 
86. This claim is supported by the number of case citations to Reynolds and the number of 
law review articles devoted to the state secrets privilege during the almost two 
decades following the 1953 Supreme Court decision in Reynolds. See infra apps. 1-2. 
87. See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1291, 1315-32 app. 
88. See, e.g., Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir 1983), cert. denied, sub nom. 
Russo v. Mitchell, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
89. The Court authorized a relatively narrow state secrets privilege in Reynolds. See 
Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 56; Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268,276 n.l 
(4th Cir. 1980) (Phillips, J., concurring and dissenting); Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 9. 
90. See infra Part II.A. 
91. See infra Part II.A. 
92. See generally app. 3, tbl.4 (showing a timeline of state privilege cases). 
93. Some scholars have debated whether the administration of President George W. Bush 
asserted the privilege more frequently than other administrations and/or whether its 
assertion of the privilege was of a different character. See Limits of National Security 
Litigation, supra note 22, at 1271 (concluding that the administration of George W. 
Bush did not break with "past practice in asserting the privilege, either in quantitative 
or qualitative terms"). 
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bef'ore the submission of a responsive pleading.94 In other words, a 
privilege that began as a surgical incision that excised from litigation 
carefully defined evidence but otherwise left the action to proceed 
forward has been transformed into an objection that the Executive 
may assert at the very earliest stages of legal proceedings and which 
may be the basis for dismissing an action altogether. 
The vigorous expansion of the state secrets privilege was mainly 
defined and implemented by the circuit courts, as opposed to the 
Supreme Court,95 and more specifically, it was the Courts of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia96 and the Fourth Circuie7 that primarily 
pioneered the deve1opments.98 Not only did these two courts give the 
privilege a breathtaking sweep99 in their decisions, but they did so 
quickly in a handful of cases decided within only a few years of one 
another. And the judges who engineered the expansion wrote 
opinions that presented the developments as if the reasoning and 
94. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 
308 (4th Cir. 2007). 
95. See Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1242-43 (4th Cir. 1985); 
Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 63-64 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, sub nom. 
Russo v. Mitchell, 484 U.S. 870 (1987); Halkin 11,690 F.2d 977, 995-96 (D.C. Cir. 
1982); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 270-72 (4th Cir. 1980); 
Halkin 1,598 F.2d I, 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
96. See, e.g., Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 51; Halkin 11,690 F.2d at 977; Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 1. 
97. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 776 F.2d at 1236; Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 268. 
98. For example, in 1978, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia relied upon a 
1972 Fourth Circuit decision, which did not involve the state secrets privilege at all, to 
dismiss an action. Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 8-9 (citing United States v. Marchetti, 466 
F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972)). The court stated the state secrets privilege barred a 
plaintiff from having the executive branch confirm or deny whether the government 
had intercepted its communications on the basis of a "mosaic" theory, which posited 
that "[t]housands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can be 
analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen whole 
must operate." Id. at 8. Two years later, the Fourth Circuit provided no authority 
whatsoever for its order dismissing an action on the ground that plaintiff "would have 
every incentive to probe as close to the core secrets as the trial judge would permit," 
and since the plaintiff and the other trial lawyers "would remain unaware of the scope 
of exclusion of information determined to be state secrets," such probing presented an 
unacceptable risk that state secrets would be disclosed. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 
F.2d at 281. In these two cases, two leading courts of appeals with jurisdiction over 
territory, including the White House, the CIA, and the Pentagon, redefined the state 
secrets privilege giving it a sweep that gave the Executive a major weapon in 
litigation in which the privilege was implicated. 
99. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
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outcomes in the cases were obvious, inevitable, and required by prior 
decisions. 100 
During the expansion of the privilege, very few circuit courts 
narrowed the potential scope of the privilege, but to the extent that 
there was such a narrowing, those opinions were reversed either after 
an en banc hearing 101 or by the Supreme Court. 102 Moreover, in the 
years following these early decisions, judges continued to apply and 
occasionally expand the privilege lO3 even beyond the boundaries 
demarked by the initial circuit court decisions. But, as important as 
these subsequent expansions were, their scope was modest by 
comparison to the expansion that occurred in the 1970s and the early 
1980s. 104 
During this development of the privilege, the Supreme Court 
mainly limited itself to endorsing what the circuit courts did without 
providing even a thoughtful discussion assessing the privilege in 
general or in the particular case at hand. 105 Furthermore, although 
this dynamic expansion of the state secrets privilege defines a 
contemporary privilege that is well beyond the boundaries and scope 
of the privilege's guidelines set forth in Reynolds, the Court has not 
reconsidered the Reynolds decision in light of the expansion. 106 
The consequence of this expansion is that the state secrets privilege 
has come into sharp focus and legal scholars and commentators have 
become intensely critical of the doctrine. In particular, these critics 
have focused on the judiciary's failure to provide a remedy for 
possibly wronged individuals in cases involving the state secrets 
100. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
101. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 579 F.3d 943, 957-58, 962 (9th Cir. 2009), 
rev'd en bane, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
102. See, e.g., Doe v. Tenet, 329 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
103. See, e.g., Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
104. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text. 
105. Since Reynolds, the Court has cited Reynolds only twenty-three times. See infra app. 
3, tbl.4. 
106. The Supreme Court had the opportunity to address the state secrets privilege 
numerous times since the Reynolds decision; however, it denied certiorari in many 
instances. See United States v. EI-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2011), eert. denied, 
133 S. Ct. 525 (2012); Mohamed v. Jeppesen Datap1an, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc), eert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 2442 (2011); United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 
72 (2d Cir. 2008), eert denied, 559 U.S. 1107 (2009); EI-Masri v. United States, 479 
F.3d 296 (4th Cir.), eert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007); Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338 
(4th Cir. 2005), eert. denied, 546 U.S. 1093 (2006); Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 
(9th Cir.), eert. denied, 525 U.S. 967 (1998); In re United States, 872 F.2d 472 (D.C. 
Cir.), eert. dismissed, 493 U.S. 960 (1989); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. 
Cir. 1983), eert. denied, 484 U.S. 870 (1987). 
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privilege and to fashion a set of rules that checked the executive 
branch's use of the doctrine so as to minimize the risk of the 
executive branch's "caprice" and abuse of the privilege.107 Indeed, 
there is now evidence that the privilege is in such disfavor that the 
Department of Justice characterizes it as a doctrine of last resort, 108 
and that judges prefer other doctrines to the state secrets privilege in 
shielding the Executive. 109 
B. Shielding Unlawful Conduct 
It is central to the American creed that the United States is 
committed to a government ruled by law. 110 When John Marshall 
wrote over two centuries ago that the United States is a "government 
of laws, and not of men,,,lll he penned words that not only set forth a 
national aspiration at the time but words that have echoed across the 
eras of American history as setting forth one of the nation's most 
fundamental commitments that has become part of America's identity 
107. See generally Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1249-50 
(discussing Congressional reformation of the state secrets privilege to ameliorate its 
impact); Frost, supra note 22, at 1931-32 (discussing plaintiffs' primary arguments 
against the use of the state secrets privilege); Lyons, supra note 22, at 111-12 
(arguing that the state secrets privilege is misused). 
108. The brief filed on behalf of the United States in AI-Aulaqi v. Obama states, 
"Consistent with the judicial admonition that the state secrets privilege be 'invoked no 
more often or extensively than necessary,' the Court should not reach the privilege 
issue if the case can be resolved on the preceding grounds .... " Opposition to 
Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Memorandum in Support of 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 43, AI-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 
2010) (No. 10-CV-1469), 2010 WL 3863135 at *20 (citation omitted). Also, in Arar 
v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), the trial judge relied upon the state secrets 
privilege as a reason to dismiss the complaint, whereas the majority opinion in the en 
banc decision narrowly construed the Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971), line of cases to preclude authorizing a 
claim for relief based on Bivens, in the circumstances presented by Arar. But see 
Charlie Savage & David E. Sanger, White House Tries to Prevent Judge From Ruling on 
Surveillance Efforts, N.Y. TrMEs(Dec. 21, 20l3), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2013/12/22/us!white-house-tries-to-prevent-judge-from-ruling-on-
surveillance-efforts.html. 
109. See supra cases cited in notes 6-10. 
110. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. l37, 163 (1803); Barack Obama, President of the United 
States, Speech at the National Defense University (May 23, 2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/05/24/us/politics/transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-
drone-policy.html ("So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al Qaeda but 
we also sought to change its course ... , We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed 
our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law, 
and expanded our consultations with Congress."). 
111. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163. 
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among the nations of the world. Nonetheless, during the last four 
decades, courts-the very governing institution most responsible for 
assuring that Marshall's admonition is respected throughout the 
realm-have undermined this tenet by sustaining the state secrets 
privilege to shield executive conduct that is arguably unlawful. 
Two cases, separated by three decades, illustrate this point. In 
1978, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
utilized the privilege to dismiss an action in which individuals and 
organizations opposed to the United States military involvement in 
Vietnam claimed that former federal officials as well as private 
corporations acted in concert to conduct "warrantless interceptions of 
their international wire, cable and telephone communications.,,112 
The meaning of the dismissal meant-in the words of former Chief 
Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit David L. Bazelon who submitted a dissent-that the state 
secrets privilege "immunize [ d] conduct that appears to be proscribed 
by the Fourth Amendment,,,))3 and thus "becomes a shield behind 
which the government may insulate unlawful behavior from scrutiny 
and redress by citizens who are the target of the government's 
surveillance.,,114 
In a post-September 11 case-Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, 
Inc.,115 decided by the Ninth Circuit in 201 O-five individuals 
claimed that the CIA, working in concert with other government 
agencies and officials of foreign governments, "operated an 
extraordinary rendition program to gather intelligence by 
apprehending foreign nationals suspected of involvement in terrorist 
activities and transferring them in secret to foreign countries for 
detention and interrogation by United States or foreign officials"116 
by "methods that would [otherwise have been] prohibited under 
federal or internationallaw.,,117 The plaintiffs alleged that Jeppesen 
Dataplan, Inc., a U.S. corporation, had "provided flight planning and 
logistical support services to the aircraft and crew on all of the flights 
transporting each of the five plaintiffs among the various locations 
where they were detained and allegedly subjected to torture." 11 8 In 
relying upon the privilege to dismiss the complaint, Circuit Judge 
112. Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
113. Id. at 13 (Bazelon, J., dissenting). 
114. Id. at 13-14. 
115. 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en bane). 
116. Id. at 1073. 
117. ld. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
118. ld. at 1075. 
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Raymond C. Fisher framed the issue as a collision in fundamental 
values between government under law and a secure government: 
This case requires us to address the difficult balance the 
state secrets doctrine strikes between fundamental principles 
of our liberty, including justice, transparency, accountability 
and national security. Although as judges we strive to honor 
all of these principles, there are times when exceptional 
circumstances create an irreconcilable conflict between 
them. 119 
The use of the state secrets privilege to shield arguably unlawful 
executive conduct is a remarkable doctrinal development. After all, 
if Congress is to pass statutes that establish the nation's laws, it 
behooves the courts to make law that permits or even encourages the 
Executive to violate those laws with impunity. 
What explains this development? There was nothing in the 
Reynolds decision and the early state secret cases cited in Reynolds 
that authorized the use of the privilege to shield unlawful conduct.120 
Rather, in those early cases the state secrets privilege was applied in 
tort, commercial, or patent cases,121 and, in the Reynolds case itself, 
the privilege was applied to protect Air Force documents in a tort 
action authorized by the Federal Tort Claims Act122 against the 
United States. 123 And while Reynolds did not explicitly prohibit the 
extension of the privilege to shield unlawful executive conduct, it 
surely did not mandate or invite the extension of the privilege and 
there is nothing in the opinion that even suggests that the Reynolds 
Court anticipated such a development. 124 
119. Id. at 1073. Judge Fisher's frank acknowledgement that the state secrets privilege 
shielded unlawful conduct is unusual. What is more common is the approach taken 
by Judge Edwards in the Ellsberg case and Judge Scalia in the Moliero case-to just 
ignore the issue. 
120. E.g., United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I (1953). 
121. See Cresmer v. United States, 9 F.R.D. 203,204 (E.D.N.Y. 1949); Bank Line Ltd. v. 
United States, 68 F. Supp. 587, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 1946); Pollen v. Ford Instrument Co., 
26 F. Supp. 583, 583-84 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); Firth Sterling Steel Co. v. Bethlehem Steel 
Co., 199 F. 353, 353-54 (E.D. Pa. 1912). But see Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 
105, 105-08 (1875) (holding state secrets barred an action for breach of contract 
stemming from a contract made during the Civil War). 
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(I) (2012). 
123. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 2-3. 
124. Apart from a few opinions written in the 1970s and the dissent in Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (Hawkins J., 
dissenting), there are not many published judicial objections to the use of the privilege 
to shield unlawful Executive conduct. Robert M. Chesney concluded similarly in 
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Moreover, no one claims in defense of the judicially crafted 
privilege that United States officials have a right to violate the law to 
protect the national security. Obviously, there may well be a dispute 
as to whether specified conduct does or does not violate the law, or 
whether a particular defendant has 'a defense such as qualified 
immunity.!25 But no one challenges the underlying premise that the 
law must be obeyed. Nor have recent presidential administrations 
taken the widely criticized position insisted upon by President Nixon 
that an act that might otherwise be a violation of the law is not a 
violation when the President orders it to guard the national 
security,126 nor do they espouse a utilitarian rationale that maintains 
that the protection of national security justifies breaking the law. 
Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that there are important 
differences between the Executive and the judiciary on this matter. 
Federal judges who sustain the privilege to shield unlawful conduct 
are not themselves committing an unlawful act, nor are they 
responsible for directing such conduct. There is a difference between 
courts not requiring the executive branch to disclose certain 
information or documents that might be evidence of such unlawful 
conduct and courts actually approving of unlawful executive conduct. 
Nonetheless, these distinctions are not absolutions. The state secrets 
privilege is a judge-made rule,127 allegations of unlawful executive 
conduct are not new or even rare, and judges who sustain the 
privilege in such cases do so knowing that they are shielding 
arguably unlawful conduct and creating a dynamic that encourages 
State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1252 
("[T]he survey indicates that post-Reynolds efforts to categorically exclude 
application of the privilege to suits alleging government misconduct did not gain 
traction. "). 
125. The Supreme Court discussed qualified immunity in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 
2074 (2011). 
126. Great Interviews of the 2dh Century, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 7, 2007, 5:18 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.comltheguardianl2007 /sep/07 / greatinterviews 1 (Interview 
with Richard Nixon and David Frost on May 20, 1977). For two recent examples of 
presidential administrations not following in President's Nixon's footsteps, see 
Charlie Savage, Obama Tests Limits of Power in Syrian Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/09/09/worldlmiddleeastlobama-tests-limits-of-
power-in-syrian-conflict.html, and Secretary of State Colin Powell's speech to the 
United Nations Security Council seeking affinnation for the attack on Iraq because of 
the alleged threat presented by the regime's possession of weapons of mass 
destruction, Colin Powell, Sec'y of State, Address to the United Nations Security 
Council (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://www.theguardian.comlworldl2003/feb/05/iraq.usa. 
127. E.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1094 (Hawkins, J., dissenting) ("The state 
secrets doctrine is a judicial construct without foundation in the Constitution .... "). 
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future unlawful conduct. In other words, what the courts have 
knowingly done is to build into the functioning of the national 
security state an insulating dynamic that pennits, if not invites, public 
officials to violate the law with impunity.128 The consequence is that 
courts have expanded the privilege-a privilege whose purpose was 
to protect the nation and its ideals, including a commitment to a rule 
of law-to the point where the privilege has become dangerous not 
only to aggrieved individuals, but to the constitutional order, as well 
as the moral legitimacy of the jUdiciary. 129 
Against these considerations, it is difficult to do anything more 
than to speculate about why courts not only expanded the state 
secrets privilege to shield alleged unlawful conduct but why no 
member of the Supreme Court has ever written a public opinion 
criticizing the development or suggesting ways to minimize such use 
of the privilege. But with that important caveat in mind, it does seem 
that the use of the privilege to shield unlawful conduct is a direct 
outgrowth of the mindset that generated the entire Age of Deference 
itself; a mindset so deferential to the Executive in national security 
matters that it not only has converted the federal courts into acting as 
if they were an extension of the executive branch-and not an 
independent and co-equal branch of government-but has also 
persuaded the very judges whose primary mission is to uphold the 
rule of law to betray that obligation for reasons the very same judges 
decide are more significant. 130 
128. See id. at 1073 (majority opinion). 
129. See Limits o/National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1268. 
130. In his memoir, William Colby recounts an incident that may shed some light on the 
zeitgeist in Washington, D.C. when Halkin I was decided as well as other later cases 
in which the state secrets privilege was used to shield unlawful conduct. WILLIAM 
COLBY & PETER FORBATH, HONORABLE MEN: My LIFE IN THE CIA 389-400 (1978). 
Colby tells of an exchange with Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller, who co-chaired a 
blue-ribbon commission,-which became known as the Rockefeller Commission-
investigating public claims that the CIA had violated federal law. Although Colby 
maintained that the "CIA was not engaged in domestic spying or any other illegal 
activity," id. at 393, as of 1975, the content of his statements to the commission were 
"too open and candid for some people's tastes," id. at 400, and, as a result, after 
giving testimony on one occasion: 
Vice President Rockefeller[] drew me aside into his office ... and 
said in his most charming manner, "Bill, do you really have to 
present all this material to us? We realize that there are secrets 
that you fellows need to keep and so nobody here is going to take 
it amiss if you feel that there are some questions you can't answer 
quite as fully as you seem to feel you have to. 
ld. Colby wrote in his memoir that he understood Rockefeller disapproved of his 
"approach to the CIA's troubles," and that he would have preferred Colby to "take the 
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C. A Sweeping Privilege 
During the last forty years, many distinct doctrinal developments l31 
have combined to create a robust and sweeping expansion of the state 
secrets privilege. The themes that compose the expansion are 
theoretically distinct from one another,132 but in practice they are 
interrelated, reinforce each other, and create a chain of thinking that 
constitutes a dynamic and breathtakingly expansive state secrets 
privilege. 133 
1. Unacceptable Risks 
The most threatening doctrinal theme to a party arguably wronged 
by executive officials is the idea that the privilege must be sustained 
and the entire action dismissed to avoid an ''unacceptable risk"134 that 
traditional stance of fending off investigators by drawing the cloak of secrecy around 
the Agency in the name of national security." Id. 
In his study, Bomb Power: The Modern Presidency and the National Security State, 
Gary Wills places Colby's forthrightness in a political context that may well have 
filtered through the judiciary and helped shape a perspective that made the use of the 
state secrets privilege in such cases seem legitimate. Wills wrote that the "secret 
subversions," which included sabotage, economic pressure and invasion, "were 
guarded so carefully that their nickname in the Agency was 'the family jewels,'" and 
that when Colby revealed secrets, "Agency loyalists and their right-wing supporters 
treated this as an act of treason" for in so doing Colby "betrayed the protectors of the 
nation." WILLS, supra note 2, at 177. Indeed, just to polish the point a bit more, Wills 
wrote: "When Richard Helms defied Congress, and when William Casey lied to 
Congress, they were considered the true patriots." Id. 
131. See supra Part II.A for a chronological analysis of developments contributing to a 
more expansive state secrets privilege post-Reynolds. 
132. See infra Part III for examples of the themes: unacceptable risks, mosaic doctrine, 
entanglement, and acknowledging, confirming, denying. 
133. See generally Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) ("[I]fthe 'very 
subject matter of the action' is a state secret, then the court should dismiss the 
plaintiffs action based solely on the invocation of the state secrets privilege."); 
Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting 
that even if the plaintiff could establish a prima facie case without resorting to 
privileged information, allowing the case to proceed would pose such a threat to state 
secrets as to warrant dismissal). 
134. See generally Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1087-89 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc) (dismissing the action because of the "unacceptable risk" of 
disclosing state secrets no matter what "protective procedures" might be employed); 
EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308 (4th Cir. 2007) ("[T]he state secrets 
doctrine protects sensitive military intelligence information from disclosure in court 
proceedings, and that dismissal at the pleading stage is appropriate if state secrets are 
so central to a proceeding that it cannot be litigated without threatening their 
disclosure."); Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144 (dismissing case because privileged and 
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the litigation will inadvertently expose state secrets. By this 
reasoning, the privilege is sustained not to guard against the 
inevitable or even the highly likely disclosure of information that 
satisfies the conditions of the privilege, but to guard against the 
possibility that such information may be disclosed. Thus, it is 
reasoned that an inquiry during litigation into non-sensitive 
information, that itself does not disclose national security 
information, but which is on the "periphery,,135 of sensitive 
information, may invite lawyers "to probe as close to the core secrets 
as the trial judge would permit,"136 and that during such probing, the 
trial judge, seeking to prevent unintentional disclosure by a witness 
under aggressive examination, may be so disadvantaged because the 
boundary separating sensitive from non-sensitive information may be 
so blurred that highly sensitive information is disclosed. 137 Because 
of this risk of inadvertent disclosure, a judge may dismiss an action 
before a responsive pleading is filed or discovery is commenced. 138 
The unacceptable risk analysis requires a judge to make a 
predictive decision regarding how lawyers and a judge will conduct 
themselves during the course of a trial. Although predictive 
decisions are vulnerable to the risk of error, judicial rulings applying 
the unacceptable risk doctrine make little effort to reduce that error 
by refining the concept of an "unacceptable risk," which leaves open 
the possibility that any risk to any harm is unacceptable. 139 The result 
is that judges possess broad, unstructured discretion in making these 
decisions, and because those decisions involve undisclosed 
information and are predictive in nature, the soundness of the judicial 
decisions cannot be evaluated. 140 
non-privileged material was inextricably linked); Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 
776 F.2d 1236, 1241-43 (4th Cir. 1985) (dismissing case based on the potential 
danger of exposing state secrets when necessary expert witness had personal 
knowledge of military secrets). 
135. Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 281 (4th Cir. 1980) ("Information 
within the possession of the parties on the periphery of the suppression order would 
not readily be recognized by counsel, unaware of the specific contents of the affidavit, 
as being secret or as clearly having been suppressed by the general order of the district 
court."). 
136. Id. 
137. See Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1082-83. 
138. See id. at 1081. 
139. See id. at 1083; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 304-05 (indicating that the state secret privilege 
should be upheld when there is any "reasonable danger" that secrets will be exposed). 
140. See supra note 134 and accompanying text; see also In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 
153 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("It remains for the district court on remand to determine what 
procedures would be required to safeguard against disclosure of privileged materials 
and then to determine whether [the] lawsuit can proceed."); Bareford v. Gen. 
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The unacceptable risk doctrine is a substantial expansion of the 
state secret rules set forth in Reynolds. As noted, the Court in 
Reynolds protected specifically defined and particularized 
infonnation during the discovery stage of the case and left the action 
otherwise intact to proceed until such time that it became 
unequivocally plain that the plaintiff was unable to establish a prima 
facie case without the information covered by the privilege. 141 In 
contrast, the unacceptable-risk-of-disclosing-state-secrets line of 
argument is predictive in character and it results in the dismissal of 
the entire action. 142 
Courts explain the early dismissal remedy-the limiting or cutting 
off of litigation "to protect state secrets, even before any discovery or 
evidentiary requests have been made"-by claiming that "waiting for 
specific evidentiary disputes to arise would be both unnecessary and 
potentially dangerous.,,143 
The idea that a case should be dismissed to avoid the 
"unnecessary" taxing of limited judicial resources and to avoid 
wasteful expenses associated with litigation seems on its face totally 
reasonable. l44 In general, there would be little justification for a 
judge to indulge litigation that was truly "unnecessary." But whether 
a legal action in which a state secrets privilege is asserted is 
"unnecessary" depends entirely-at least in this context-on the 
capacity of a judge to predict whether the litigation of the claims will 
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir. 1992) (affirming the dismissal of 
an action in the absence of a record of in camera proceedings in the district court); 
Fitzgerald v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 776 F.2d 1236, 1241-42 (4th Cir. 1985) ("Due to 
the nature of the question presented in th[e] action and the proof required by the 
parties.to establish or refute the claim, the very subject of this litigation is itself a state 
secret."); Farnsworth Cannon, Inc., 635 F.2d at 281 (affirming the dismissal upon 
. review of an in camera affidavit). 
141. 345 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1953). 
142. See, e.g., Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d at 1079. As the Ninth Circuit has stated 
"the assertion of privilege will require dismissal because ... litigating the case to a 
judgment on the merits would present an unacceptable risk of disclosing state 
secrets." Id. The Fourth Circuit echoed those words in El-Masri: "a proceeding in 
which the state secrets privilege is successfully interposed must be dismissed if the 
circumstances make clear that privileged information win be so central to the 
litigation that any attempt to proceed will threaten that information's disclosure." 479 
F.3d at 308. 
143. Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d at 1081. The Court in Jeppesen also cites to 
Sterling v. Tenet, 416 F.3d 338, 344 (4th Cir. 2005) to support this proposition. Id. 
144. See generally Jeppesen Dataplan Inc., 614 F.3d at 1081 (indicating that when it 
becomes certain that state secrets would be divulged in an action, further litigation 
would be "unnecessary."). 
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risk the inadvertent disclosure of information injurious to national 
security. Given that a judge would be in a far better position to 
assess whether additional litigation of a particular action is 
unnecessary by permitting the action to proceed,145 judges should 
dismiss cases to reduce litigation costs only when the circumstances 
make it certain that further litigation would be wasteful. 
But conserving adjudicatory resources is not the major 
consideration underlying the unacceptable risk doctrine. The primary 
concern is that any further litigation will present an unacceptable risk 
that sensitive information will be inadvertently disclosed. 146 While 
this is an understandable consideration, the fear of inadvertent 
disclosure seems greatly exaggerated since it is difficult to 
understand how a mere submission of interrogatories or a request for 
documents could be so "potentially dangerous" as to warrant 
dismissal of a complaint in which an individual alleges kidnapping 
and torture. It is equally difficult to understand how a witness being 
deposed with an attorney (or several attorneys) in the room could 
inadvertently disclose security information. 147 Moreover, given that 
judges take almost as hallowed ground the assumption that the 
judicial function is best performed in a concrete factual context,148 it 
is peculiar for the courts to have fashioned a rule which puts a judge 
145. See id. at 1095 (Bea, J., concurring) ("[W]hen responsive pleading is complete and 
discovery under way, judgments as to whether secret material is essential to Plaintiffs' 
case or Jeppesen's defense can be made more accurately."). 
146. Id. at 1087 (majority opinion). In Jeppesen, the court, sitting en banc, stated that 
plaintiffs' prima facie case and the defendant's defense "may not inevitably depend on 
privileged evidence." Id. Or, to put the matter in a positive mode, the plaintiff may 
be able to prove a prima facie case without relying upon information covered by the 
state secrets privilege and the defendants may be able to mount complete defenses 
relying on information not covered by the state secrets privilege. Nonetheless, the 
court dismissed the complaint before a responsive pleading was filed on the ground 
that "there is no feasible way to litigate [the defendant's] alleged liability without 
creating an unjustifiable risk of divulging state secrets." Id. (emphasis added). 
147. But see General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1904 (2011), in 
which Justice Scalia stated that a former Navy official "revealed military secrets 
neither side's litigation team was authorized to know," and that "[c]opies of the 
unclassified deposition were widely distributed and quoted in unsealed court filings 
until Government security officials discovered the breach a month later." The 
reliability of Justice Scalia's factual assertions has been called into question by a 
nationally prominent circuit judge. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of 
Antonin Scalia, THE NEW REpUBLIC (Aug. 24,2012), http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/magazinelbooks-and-arts/l 06441 Iscalia-gamer -reading-the-Iaw-textual-
originalism. 
148. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 581 (1992); Valley Forge Christian CoIl. v. Am. United, 454 U.S. 464, 
472 (1982); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,528-30 (1961). 
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in a disadvantaged position by requiring a predictive decision in a 
comparatively abstract context. 149 But that is precisely what the 
courts have done. ISO 
2. Mosaic Doctrine 
What is now termed the Mosaic theory had modest origins. lSI In 
1972, the Fourth Circuit decided a dispute between a former Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) agent, Victor Marchetti, and the CIA over 
the applicability of a secrecy agreement the former agent had signed 
as a condition of his employment to a book Marchetti had written-
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence-that was scheduled to be 
published by Knopf. 152 The court concluded that the secrecy 
agreement, which barred Marchetti from disclosing "classified 
information obtained during the course of [his] employment," which 
was not already in the public domain, was valid. 153 Moreover, Circuit 
Judge Haynsworth claimed that the courts should defer to executive 
branch judgments regarding confidential information; he explained: 
There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial 
review of secrecy classifications. The significance of one 
item of information may frequently depend upon knowledge 
of many other items of information. What may seem trivial 
to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who 
has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned 
item of information in its proper context. The courts, of 
149. See supra text accompanying notes 139-140. A dissent by Circuit Judge Francis D. 
Murnaghan, Jr. of the Fourth Circuit makes plain the hazards of the unacceptable risk 
analysis; 
Any litigant in the Fourth Circuit whose proof is hampered by the 
invocation of state secrets can hereafter be turned away from his 
efforts to obtain justice on the questionable grounds that, for 
reasons as to which he must remain uninformed, he might stumble 
intrusively into a protected area. The opportunities for 
unexplicated imposition of arbitrary fiat under the rule the 
majority adopts are potentially frightening. 
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268, 282-83 (4th Cir. 1980) 
(Murnaghan, J., dissenting). 
150. See George, supra note 22, at 1697-99, for a discussion of this development. 
151. United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972); see also Halkin I, 
598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978) for a court's first use of the term "mosaic" to describe 
the state secrets theory. 
152. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1311-12; VICTOR MARCHETTI & JOHN D. MARKS, THE CIA 
AND THE CULT OF INTELLIGENCE (1974). 
153. Marchetti, 466 F.2d at 1317. 
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course, are ill equipped to become sufficiently steeped in 
foreign intelligence matters to serve effectively in the 
review of secrecy classifications in that area. 154 
Thus, Haynsworth cautioned that judges should defer because they 
were not competent to assess the sensitivity of tidbits of information 
that arguably formed a mosaic. 155 
Contemporary cases expanding the state secrets doctrine have used 
Haynsworth's statements as a jumping off point to expand the state 
secrets privilege by importing the mosaic theory into the privilege, 156 
thus giving rise to the question of the degree to which the mosaic 
theory should expand the privilege. By comparison to the Reynolds 
decision-which was limited to information that itself presented an 
allegedly unmistakable threat to national security-the utilization of 
the mosaic theory by the state secrets privilege constitutes an 
enormous expansion of the scope of the information protected by the 
privilege. 157 Moreover, as it is now construed by the courts, the idea 
of the theory-that only experienced individuals steeped in national 
security can know if seemingly harmless tidbits of information can be 
disclosed without causing harm-profoundly disables judges from 
exercising meaningful review over executive judgments. 158 The 
result is that the inclusion of the mosaic rationale into the state secrets 
privilege greatly expands the scope of information that is potentially 
protected by the privilege. 
3. Entanglement 
Circuit Judge Harry Edwards gave early expression to the 
entanglement theme when he explained that the Supreme Court had 
154. Id.at1318. 
155. See id. 
156. See, e.g., Kasza v. Brown, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that RCRA 
claims against the Air Force risked exposing military secrets); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 
159, 178 (1985) (stating that the CIA director has the power to withhold superficially 
innocuous information to protect the identity of an intelligence source); Halkin I, 598 
F.2d at 8-9 (holding that the NSA does not need to release the identification of the 
individuals or organizations whose communications the agency may have acquired). 
157. Compare United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 -11 (1953) (holding that the state 
secrets privilege may only be used when there is a "strong showing of necessity"), 
with Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170 (affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claim because 
proceeding on the merits may have revealed military secrets), Sims, 471 U.S. at 173-
74 (applying the mosaic theory to prevent the release of innocuous information to 
protect intelligence sources), and Halkin I, 598 F.2d at 9 (holding that where 
plaintiffs' action must be dismissed based on the mosaic theory). 
158. See George, supra note 22, at 170O-nl, for a discussion of this development. 
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stated that the state secrets privilege "is not to be lightly invoked," 
and thus "may not be used to shield any material not strictly 
necessary to prevent injury to national security," which in tum 
imposes an obligation on a court to disentangle "nonsensitive 
information" from· "sensitive information" to permit the public 
release of the nonsensitive information. 159 
Courts have fallen considerably short of that aspiration. Judge 
Rymer of the Ninth Circuit voiced the practical reality he thinks 
judges confront in seeking to disentangle sensitive from non-sensitive 
information: "The government may use the state secrets privilege to 
withhold a broad range of information. Although 'whenever 
possible, sensitive information must be disentangled from 
nonsensitive information to allow for the release of the latter,' courts 
recognize the inherent limitations in trying to separate classified and 
unclassified information.,,16o Judge Rhymer's despairing point was 
made in even sharper language by Judge Higginbotham of the Fifth 
Circuit: 
Fitzgerald and Farnsworth Cannon recognize the practical 
reality that in the course of litigation, classified and 
unclassified infonnation cannot always be separated. In 
some cases, it is appropriate that the courts restrict the 
parties' access not only to evidence which itself risks the 
disclosure of a state secret, but also those pieces of evidence 
or areas of questioning which press so closely upon highly 
sensitive material that they create a high risk of inadvertent 
or indirect disclosures. 161 
The perspective cautioning disentanglement rests on two lines of 
analysis. 162 One is the mosaic approach. Pursuant to this perspective, 
because innocuous information may unintentionally disclose missing 
pieces of a mosaic that result in insights not previously understood, 
judges must be mindful not to disentangle for fear of making an 
error. 163 The second line of analysis concedes that non-sensitive 
information may be identified, but maintains that because this 
information may be on the "periphery" of sensitive information, 
159. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 57 (D.C. Cir 1983). 
160. Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Ellsberg, 709 F.2d at 
57). 
161. Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1143-44 (5th Cir. 1992). 
162. See supra note 98. 
163. See Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1,8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
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judges may err in disentangling the information thus creating an 
unacceptable risk. 164 
The judicial paralysis arising from the entanglement theme assumes 
that judges are not competent to distinguish sensitive from non-
sensitive information-even assuming they can distinguish between 
them-and to police the boundary between these two categories. In 
short, judicial incompetence stymies judges. 165 However, as 
discussed below, the judicial incompetence theme that streaks 
through the state secrets privilege is exaggerated to the point of being 
unpersuasive. 
4. Acknowledging, Confirming, Denying 
It is one thing for a court to sustain the executive branch's assertion 
of the state secrets privilege to protect information that is 
quintessentially military, diplomatic, or intelligence in character, and 
it is quite another for a court to sustain the privilege so that the 
executive branch is relieved from merely acknowledging the validity 
or invalidity of information already in the public domain, which is 
itself not a military, diplomatic, or intelligence secret, which does not 
form part of a mosaic, and which is not implicated in the examination 
of a witness in a public trial and does not create an unacceptable risk. 
Nonetheless, that is what contemporary courts have done. 166 Thus, 
although in a 1992 opinion Judge Higginbotham was plainly 
concerned by the "troubling sweep" of the Executive's argument 
based on an "acknowledgment" consideration, he sustained the 
position: "The government maintains that, even if the data is 
available from non-secret sources, acknowledgement of this 
information by government officers would still be damaging to the 
government, because the acknowledgement would lend credibility to 
the unofficial data." 167 
The previously discussed Balkin i 68 case provides a concrete 
illustration of the "acknowledgment" development and, to appreciate 
the extraordinary reach of the acknowledgment rationale, it is 
necessary to examine the Balkin I opinion in detail. In that case, the 
plaintiffs claimed that the National Security Agency (NSA) violated 
their rights under the Constitution when it conducted warrantless 
164. See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
165. See infra notes 325-326 and accompanying text. 
166. See Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1144 ("These cases stand for the proposition that disclosure 
of information by government officials can be prejudicial to government interests, 
even if the information has already been divulged from non-government sources."). 
167. Id. (citing Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765-66 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
168. See supra text accompanying notes 112-114. 
2014 The Courts and National Security 67 
interceptions of their international wire, cable, and telephone 
communications.!69 "The Secretary of Defense avers that admitting 
or denying the acquisitions would reveal important military and state 
secrets respecting the capabilities of the NSA for the collection and 
analysis of foreign intelligence.,,!70 More specifically, he claimed 
that "if he were required to identify whose foreign communications 
were acquired, or to disclose the dates or contents of the acquired 
communications," the NSA's capabilities would be "jeopardized.,,!7! 
The plaintiffs responded, "that the state secrets privilege cannot 
extend to the 'mere fact of interception' of their communications," 
and argued that "admission or denial of the fact of acquisition of their 
communications without identification of acquired messages would 
not reveal which circuits NSA has targeted or the methods and 
techniques employed.,,!72 
The Court of Appeals sustained the Secretary of Defense's 
position, and it did so by labeling the plaintiffs' position as "naIve," 
and asserting that a "number of inferences flow from the 
confirmation or denial of acquisition of a particular individual's 
international communications.,,!73 At that point, the court made a 
series of claims to support its assertion that "[ a] number of inferences 
flow from the confirmation.,,!74 The court stated that: 
[T]he individual himself and any foreign organizations with 
which he has communicated would know what circuits were 
used . . .175 any foreign government or organization that has 
dealt with a plaintiff whose communications are known to 
have been acquired would at the very least be alerted that its 
communications might have been compromised or that it 
might itself be a target ... !76 [the] identification of which 
plaintiffs' communications were and which were not 
acquired could provide valuable information!77 as to what 
circuits were monitored and what methods of acquisition 
were employed ... [and the disclosures] of the identities of 
169. Halkin 1,598 F.2d 1,3 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
170. Id. at 3--4. 





176. Id. (emphasis added). 
177. Id. (emphasis added). Notice that the court did not state that the disclosure "would" 
provide such information. 
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the intercepted parties "would enable foreign governments 
or organizations to extrapolate the focus and concerns of our 
nation's intelligence agencies. 178 
The circuit court then stated that "[a] number of inferences flow 
from the confirmation or denial.,,179 The language of this claim-that 
a "number of inferences flow from the confirmation or denial" of the 
intercepts I 8°-plainly means that the court has concluded that the 
"inferences" will in fact result from the acknowledgement. But the 
certainty of that general claim is not supported by the analysis that 
follows, which is conjectural in character. Moreover, the harm 
described in the other two sentences is almost identical to the harm 
that would result if the plaintiffs merely disclosed how they 
communicated with whom and when. As for the harm described in 
the two sentences written in conjectural terms, that harm is also 
identical to the harm that would result from plaintiffs' actual 
disclosure, except for revealing what the court terms the "methods of 
acquisition,,,181 and then it is not at all clear why acknowledgment 
would in fact disclose "methods." 
The court also incorrectly assumed that the information that it 
identified as harmful would be disclosed only if the government was 
required to confirm or deny the alleged interceptions. 182 The 
plaintiffs could disclose those facts. The plaintiffs knew how it had 
communicated, with whom it had communicated, and when it had 
done SO.183 Thus, while only some of plaintiffs' communications 
might have been intercepted, plaintiffs' disclosure of this information 
would have alerted foreign governments and organizations that at 
least some communications were being intercepted, and it would 
have identified the means of communications that were subject to 
interception. Thus, the importance of the government's confirmation 
or denial of the interceptions boils down to the difference between 
what information would be disclosed if, on the one hand, the 




182. Id. Other courts have made this assumption as well, focusing not on the ability of the 
plaintiff to disclose harmful information but on the harm caused by government 
acknowledgment of potentially sensitive information. See, e.g., Bareford v. Gen. 
Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The government maintains 
that, even if the data is available from non-secret sources, acknowledgment of this 
information by government officers would still be damaging to the government, 
because the acknowledgment would lend credibility to unofficial data."). 
183. Halkin 1,598 F.2d at 8. 
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government was required to confinn and deny, and on the other hand, 
the plaintiff disclosed what infonnation it possessed. Whatever the 
totality of this infonnation may be, it is certainly much less than the 
totality of infonnation described by the circuit court. 184 
The Executive consistently claims that confinning, denying, or 
acknowledging certain infonnation will compromise national 
security.18S That may well be correct with regard to some infonnation 
in some contexts, but it certainly is not a convincing position in all 
contexts. Yet out of deference to the Executive, courts do seem very 
willing to defer to such Executive assertions. And when this dynamic 
is combined with the other three themes-unacceptable risk, mosaic 
and entanglement-the sweeping character of the modem state 
secrets privilege is apparent. 
5. Allocation of Burdens 
In the last decades, courts have extended the Reynolds rule from a 
privilege that keeps infonnation from a plaintiff to a privilege 
pertinent to infonnation sought by the defendant. 186 By itself, such an 
extension is an appropriate application of the Reynolds rule. But 
courts have construed this extension so that the burdens of the 
privilege fall exclusively on the plaintiff. 187 
The baseline rule for assigning the burden of the privilege when the 
information in dispute is pertinent to the defendant was set forth by 
Circuit Judge Max Rosenn: "If ... the infonnation related not to the 
plaintiffs claim, but rather to the defense, summary judgment against 
the plaintiff is proper if the district court decided that the privileged 
infonnation, if available to the defendant, would establish a valid 
defense to the claim."188 Circuit Judge Higginbotham characterized 
the basic rule this way: with few but notable exceptions, most courts 
have concluded that if the state secrets privilege "would establish a 
valid defense, then the court ought to dismiss the plaintiffs' case,,,189 
or if the state secrets privilege would "deprive[] the defendant of 
information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense 
184. Id. 
185. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974). 
186. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143; Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 825 (D.C. Cir. 
1984). 
187. See, e.g., Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143. 
188. In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., United 
States v. Albertson, 493 U.S. 960 (1989). 
189. Bareford, 973 F.2d at 1143. 
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to the claim, then the court may grant summary judgment to the 
defendant." 190 
Some courts have expanded the application of the rule. 191 These 
courts have decided that a defendant may benefit from a summary 
judgment or a dismissal ruling even if the information in dispute will 
only "hamper" a defendant in establishing a defense or curtail a cross 
examination of a plaintiffs witness as opposed to denying a party of 
a complete and valid defense. 192 Thus, Judge Winter of the Second 
Circuit wrote in Zuckerbraun v. General Dynamics Corp.: "Similarly, 
it has been held that, if the court determines that the privilege so 
hampers the defendant in establishing a valid defense that the trier is 
likely to reach an erroneous conclusion, then dismissal is also 
proper." 193 More recently, an en banc Ninth Circuit opinion further 
stretched these already extended rules. 194 There, the majority 
reasoned: 
[W]e do not hold that any of the documents plaintiffs have 
submitted are subject to the privilege; rather, we conclude 
that even assuming plaintiffs could establish their entire case 
solely through nonprivileged evidence-unlikely as that 
may be-any effort by Jeppesen to defend would 
unjustifiably risk disclosure of state secrets. 195 
Sustaining the state secrets privilege imposes a serious burden, and 
as is apparent, courts do not parcel out the burdens between the 
plaintiff and the defendant. Thus, a plaintiff who claims that it can 
establish a prima facie case relying only on information in the public 
domain may have its complaint dismissed because litigation pertinent 
to the defense may result in an unacceptable risk of disclosing 
national security information, and, a defendant, whose capacity to 
cross examine a witness may be hampered by the privilege, may be 
entitled to have plaintiff s case dismissed. Either way the defendant 
190. Id. at 1141 (citing In re United States, 872 F.2d at 476; Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825). 
19l. See, e.g., Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 547 (2d Cir. 1991); 
Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825. 
192. See Barefard, 973 F.2d at 1138; Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547. 
193. Zuckerbraun, 935 F.2d at 547 (emphasis added) (citing Maleria, 749 F.2d at 825). 
194. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
195. Id. at 1090 (second emphasis added). The Jeppesen majority at this point cited El-
Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 310 (4th Cir. 2010) for the proposition that 
"virtually any conceivable response [by government defendants to claims based on 
factual allegations materially identical to this case's] ... would disclose privileged 
information." (alteration in the original). Id. 
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prevails. 196 Thus, while the extension of the privilege to information 
sought by a defendant is appropriate, the allocation of the burden 
resulting from the privilege solely to the plaintiff is at odds with basic 
fairness. 
6. A New Justiciability Twist 
In two opinions, one in 1981 197 and one in 2005,198 Justice William 
Rehnquist linked the state secrets privilege to a new justiciability 
grounds. In the 1981 decision, Weinberger v. Catholic Action of 
Hawaii/Peace Education Project, the Supreme Court concluded that 
neither the National Environmental Policy Act nor any regulatory 
provisions required the Navy to prepare and release an environmental 
impact statement resulting from the construction of several weapons 
storage structures capable of storing nuclear weapons. 199 The Court 
argued that the Act's public disclosure requirements were governed 
by provisions of the Freedom of Information Act which generally 
subordinated the public's interest in ensuring that federal agencies 
comply with the Act to the Executive's need to protect national 
security secrets.200 Furthermore, because national security 
considerations prevented the Navy from confirming or denying that it 
proposed to store nuclear weapons at the facility, it had not been and 
it could not be established that the Navy proposed an action that 
required it to file solely for "internal purposes" an environmental 
impact statement.201 
Although those reasons constituted sufficient grounds on which to 
base the result in the case, Justice Rehnquist took a doctrinal step that 
enlarged the potential scope of the state secrets privilege by turning it 
from an evidentiary privilege that protected specified information 
into a new justiciability doctrine.202 The relevant doctrinal footwork 
occurred in a short paragraph in which Rehnquist quoted from a 
nineteenth century opinion-Totten v. United Statel'°3-involving a 
claim by the estate of a Civil War spy against the United States for 
unpaid compensation and then cited to the state secrets Reynolds 
196. The seeming unfairness of this result is rarely acknowledged by the courts. But see 
Farnsworth Cannon, Inc. v. Grimes, 635 F.2d 268,271-73 (4th Cir. 1980). 
197. Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw.lPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 (1981). 
198. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
199. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 146-47. 
200. !d. at 145-47. 
201. Id. at 146. 
202. See id. at 146-47. 
203. Id. (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1876)). 
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opinion as if it were in accord with the quotation from the Totten 
decision: 
Ultimately, whether or not the Navy has complied with 
[National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)] "to the fullest 
extent possible" is beyond judicial scrutiny in this case. In 
other circumstances, we have held that "public policy 
forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the 
trial of which would inevitably lead to the disclosure of 
matters which the law itself regards as confidential, and 
respecting which it will not allow the confidence to be 
violated." Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107, 23 
L.Ed.605 (1876). See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 
73 S. Ct. 528, 97 L.Ed. 727 (1953). We confront a similar 
situation in the instant case.204 
A quarter century later, Chief Justice Rehnquist pushed this 
doctrinal opening forward one more step in Tenet v. Doe.205 In 
reversing the Ninth Circuit in an espionage case, he argued that the 
Circuit Court was "quite wrong" in concluding that the Totten ruling 
did not require the dismissal of the action.206 Claiming that the Ninth 
Circuit had construed Totten to announce "merely a contract rule,,,207 
Rehnquist asserted that "Totten was not so limited,,208 because it had 
included a statement that provided: '" [P]ublic policy forbids the 
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would 
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself 
regards as confidential. ",209 Rehnquist sought to support such a 
drastic ruling by arguing that the state secrets privilege and the "more 
frequent use of in camera judicial proceedings simply cannot provide 
the absolute protection we found necessary in enunciating the Totten 
rule.,,210 
Rehnquist's opinion in the Tenet case blurred the Reynolds state 
secrets privilege with the Totten justiciability ruling. Thus, according 
to Rehnquist, dismissal-as opposed to protecting the confidentiality 
of national security information-was required in espionage cases not 
to prevent the disclosure of state secrets but because of the nature of 
204. Jd. 
205. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 10-11 (2005). 
206. Id. at 8. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875». 
210. Jd. at 11. 
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the subject matter.2l1 In Tenet, Rehnquist surely did not state that all 
cases involving state secrets were henceforth non-justiciable, but he 
opened the door to that development, and some years later, two 
circuit courts walked through that opening and further blurred the 
distinction between an evidentiary and justiciability ruling.212 
7. Constitutional Basis for the Privilege 
The brief filed on behalf of the United States in the Supreme Court 
in the Reynolds case strenuously argued in favor of a broad 
constitutionally mandated executive privilege.213 Accordingly, it is 
not possible that the high court overlooked the main argument put 
forward by the Executive, and yet, the Reynolds opinion did not state 
that what it terms "the privilege against revealing military secrets" 
was constitutionally mandated.214 It does, however, state that both 
parties make claims that have "constitutional overtones,,,215 a phrase 
that, while having no definite meaning, certainly does not mean that 
the positions of each party is constitutionally based, for if it did, 
Chief Justice Vinson would not have resorted to the ambiguous and 
unconventional word "overtones.,,216 
More importantly, the Vinson opinion makes it perfectly plain that 
the evidentiary rule it announced in Reynolds was not constitutionally 
based.217 It did that in the very sentence it used the amorphous phrase 
"constitutional overtones" when it stated that, "we find it unnecessary 
to pass upon" the parties arguments that have constitutional overtones 
because there was "a narrower ground for decision.,,218 Thus, given 
211. See id. at 9-10. 
212. See id. at 3; Mohamed v. Jeppesen Datap1an, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 
2010) (en banc); E1-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d at 310-11 (4th Cir. 2007). For 
two circuit court decisions rendered between Weinberger and Tenet blurring a rule of 
evidence with a justiciability ruling, see Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159,1166-67 
(9th Cir. 1998), and Weston v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 881 F.2d 814,815-16 
(9th Cir. 1989). See also Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th 
Cir. 1992); Bowles v. United States, 950 F.2d 154, 156 (4th Cir. 1991); Guong v. 
United States, 860 F.2d 1063, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Frost, supra note 22, at 1939-
40; Wells, supra note 22, 637--40; Christopher D. Yamaoka, Note, The State Secrets 
Privilege: What's Wrong with It, How It Got That Way, and How the Courts Can Fix 
It, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 139, 149-50 (2007). 
213. Brief for Petitioner at 53, United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) (No. 21), 1952 
WL 82378, at *53. 
214. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,6 (1953). 
215. Id. 
216. Id. . 
217. Id.at7-1O. 
218. Jd. at 6. 
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that the Reynolds majority considered the Executive's argument as 
having only "constitutional overtones," and thus something less than 
a constitutionally based argument, it stands to reason that the Court's 
reference to a "narrower ground" was a reference to a ground based 
on the common law.219 This position is further supported a few 
sentences later in the opinion when the Court stated that the privilege 
it was assessing was "well established in the law of evidence.,,22o 
Putting the matter this way was clearly intended by the Court to 
distinguish the common law character of the privilege from the 
constitutionally based character of a privilege that was rooted in 
"inherent executive power,,221 and "protected in the constitutional 
system of separation of power,,,222 which is how Vinson characterized 
the executive branch's description of a recordkeeping statute.223 
Moreover, although Vinson did cite to the Totten case, the result in 
Totten was not based on the Constitution, and the other cases cited by 
Vinson to support the claim that the privilege was "well established" 
were all common law based opinions.224 
After Reynolds, the next judicial development that in any way 
related to the common law basis of the state secrets privilege was the 
Supreme Court decision, United States v. Nixon,225 involving the 
special prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum of President Nixon's Oval 
Office tape recordings in the famous Watergate scandal tapes case 
that resulted in President Nixon's resignation of the presidency,z26 In 
that opinion, the Court rejected President Nixon's claim that the 
President was immune from judicial process, or, in the alternative, 
that the President's claim of executive privilege was an absolute 
privilege.227 But the Court concluded for the first time that the 
President's claim of an executive privilege was constitutionally based 
and it reached that conclusion even though the Constitution itself was 
silent on the matter.228 
The Court based its conclusion on two grounds. First, the Court 
concluded that presidential communications in the exercise of Article 
219. See id. 




224. Id. at 6-7, n.11. 
225. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
226. Id. at 687-88; see also K.A. McNeely-Johnson, United States v. Nixon, Twenty Years 
After: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly-An Exploration of Executive Privilege, 14 
N. ILL. U. L. REv. 251, 278 (1993). 
227. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705-07, 709-11. 
228. See id. at 705-06. 
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II powers were constitutionally protected because each of the three 
branches of government was supreme "within its own assigned area 
of constitutional duties,,,229 and, as a result, "certain powers and 
privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers, ,,230 and the 
"protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has 
similar constitutional underpinnings.,,231 Second, the Court 
suggested, without explicitly concluding, that the President's claim of 
executive privilege was also rooted in the doctrine of separation of 
powers.232 
It was against these conclusions that the Court then made 
comments with regard to military and diplomatic secrets, the role of 
the courts in matters that may involve such secrets, and the state 
secrets privilege, which gave fresh vitality to an expansive use of the 
controversial doctrine.233 The Court did this by first noting that 
President Nixon did not "place his claim of privilege on the 
ground,,234 that the communications in dispute involved "military or 
diplomatic secrets.,,235 If the President had made such a claim, the 
Court reasoned that "the courts have traditionally shown the utmost 
deference to Presidential responsibilities,,236 and, in support of such 
"utmost deference," the Court quoted from an opinion by Justice 
Robert Jackson, who actually dissented in the Reynolds case.237 The 
Court then followed that quote with one from the Reynolds case 
emphasizing the importance, in matters affecting national security, 
for the disputed information not to be reviewed even by a judge alone 
in chambers.238 
229. Id. at 705. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 705-06. 
232. See id. at 706. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 710. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. (citing C & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, III (1948)). The 
referenced quote reads: 
The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation's 
organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose 
reports neither are nor ought to be published to the world. It 
would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, 
should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken 
on information properly held secret. 
Waterman s.s. Corp., 333 U.S. at Ill. 
238. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710-11 (1974) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 10 
(1953)). 
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As important as statements in the Nixon case may be for indicating 
that the Executive, as a matter of constitutional authority, may in 
some circumstances withhold certain information from the judiciary, 
the import of that ruling does not constitutionalize the state secrets 
evidentiary rules. Those rules encompass much more than the 
Executive's authority merely to withhold information; they 
encompass a range of doctrines reviewed above, such as the 
unacceptable risk doctrine, the mosaic doctrine, the entanglement 
analysis, the resistance to having the Executive confirm or deny, 
remedial expansion, as well as the rules set forth by Chief Justice 
Vinson in the Reynolds opinion.239 Those aspects of the 
contemporary state secrets privilege are part and parcel of the 
common law evidentiary privilege.24o 
Nonetheless, that has not kept the Fourth Circuit from seeking to 
root the state secrets rules in the Constitution.241 In EI-Masri v. 
United States, the panel stated: "Although the state secrets privilege 
was developed at common law, it performs a function of 
constitutional significance, because it allows the executive branch to 
protect information whose secrecy is necessary to its military and 
foreign-affairs responsibilities.,,242 
This is no academic debate. If the state secrets privilege is a 
common law privilege, Congress may regulate it; if it is a 
constitutionally based privilege, Congress may only regulate that part 
of the privilege that courts conclude are not constitutionally based.243 
In the struggle between those wishing to protect the privilege as 
currently defined from congressional regulation and those seeking to 
curtail the privilege, the character of the privilege-whether it is a 
common law privilege or constitutionally based-makes all the 
difference. 
*** 
The expansion of the state secrets privilege beyond the boundaries 
of the Reynolds paradigm was sweeping and swift, and resulted from 
judicial discretion. Moreover, even assuming that courts in the 1970s 
and 1980s were strongly inclined to be deferential towards the 
Executive, they were not required to give the privilege the broad 
239. See supra Part II.C.I-4. 
240. See supra Part II.C.I-4. 
241. 479 F .3d 296, 303-05 (4th Cir. 2007). 
242. Id. at 303. 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 217-224. 
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sweep they did.244 Indeed, if the courts had placed emphasis on the 
Supreme Court's admonitions in the Reynolds opinion that the 
privilege not be invoked "lightly,,,245 that "[t]he court itself must 
determine whether the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of 
privilege,,,246 and that "[j]udicial control over the evidence in a case 
cannot be abdicated to the caprice of executive officers,,,247 the 
expansion of the privilege would have been modest by comparison to 
what it has become. Thus, there was nothing inevitable or pre-
ordained about the extensive expansion of the state secrets privilege 
during the last four decades; it resulted solely from the exercise of 
judicial discretion.248 
D. Consequences of the Contemporary Privilege 
The sweeping contemporary state secrets privilege generates many 
harmful consequences.249 To begin with, the idea that an individual 
may seek relief for a legal wrong in a court is a bedrock principle of a 
modem civilized society.250 And in the United States, as one judge 
has stated, "for better or worse,,,251 courts are central to granting relief 
to individuals seeking redress.252 Woodrow Wilson paid tribute to 
these values in his classic study Constitutional Government in the 
United States: "So far as the individual is concerned, a constitutional 
government is as good as its courts; no better, no worse. Its laws are 
only its professions. It keeps its promises, or does not keep them, in 
its COurtS.,,253 Thus, the courts' creation and construction of the state 
secrets privilege undermines· this promise and places a wedge 
between the nation's practice and its aspiration. 
Next, as reviewed above/54 the state secrets privilege may shield 
executive officials who have not only violated the rights of an 
244. See United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1315 (4th Cir. 1972); Dep't of Navy v. 
Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988). 
245. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1,7 (1953). 
246. Id. at 8. 
247. Id. at 9-10. 
248. See id. at 7-10. 
249. See supra text accompanying notes 12-27. 
250. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). 
251. Arar Y. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 638 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., dissenting). 
252. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 163. 
253. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 17 
(Columbia Univ. Press 1908). 
254. See supra Part II.B. 
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individual, but may have violated the federal criminal law.255 The 
consequence of such rulings is to permit such officials to escape 
accountability to the injured individual, and perhaps to permit the 
same officials to escape any liability for violating the criminallaw.256 
Indeed, it is even possible that the elimination of accountability 
creates a dynamic that may invite executive officials who are charged 
with enforcing the law to ignore legal norms in the future. 
Furthermore, central to the constitutional plan is the idea that 
unaccountable concentrated power invites abuse and that such abuse 
undermines democratic processes and threatens individual liberty.257 
By itself, the state secrets privilege does not constitute a major threat 
to the complicated constitutional structure that rests on the three co-
equal branches of government checking and balancing the exercise of 
power. But the sweep of the contemporary privilege does make its 
own distinct contribution to this harmful trend. 
When a court utilizes the privilege to dismiss an action in which a 
party asserts egregious claims-as in an extraordinary rendition 
case-not only do the courts seem as if they are washing their 
hands258 of the matter, but they may well seem as if they are bowing 
to Executive authority/59 if not complicit in the underlying 
conduct.260 Although it is uncertain the degree to which such 
outcomes undermine the public's trust in the courts and erode their 
legitimacy, it is worth recalling Justice John Paul Stevens' 
observation regarding the confrontation between the Supreme Court 
and President Nixon over whether the courts had the authority to 
255. For an example of instances where federal criminal law may have been violated due to 
the state secrets privilege, see cases cited supra note 13. 
256. See supra note 13. 
257. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723,742 (2008); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); see also SHANE, supra note 15. 
258. The allusion is to Pontius Pilate, who, in response to demands that Jesus be crucified, 
"took water and washed his hands before the crowd, saying, 'I am innocent of this 
man's blood: see to it yourselves.'" Matthew 27:24. Judge Fisher's majority opinion 
in Jeppesen dismissing a complaint alleging extraordinary rendition, although surely 
intended to be constructive, brings to mind the Pontius Pilate Biblical episode when 
he wrote: "Our holding today is not intended to foreclose-or to pre-judge-possible 
nonjudicial relief, should it be warranted for any of the plaintiffs." Mohamed v. 
Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
259. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. I 
(1942), for examples in which the judiciary is thought to have bowed to Executive 
authority. 
260. See supra Part ILB. 
2014 The Courts and National Security 79 
require Nixon to "produce the tape recordings that eventually led to 
his resignation.,,261 He wrote: 
The decision not only had a [sic] historic effect on American 
politics and society but also powerfully illustrated the 
integrity and independence of the Court. It may well have 
done more to inspire the confidence in the work of judges 
that is the true backbone of the rule of law than any other 
decision in the history of the Court.262 
If Justice Stevens is correct, the Court gains public trust when it 
takes its independence seriously and holds the Executive legally 
accountable. The courts' sweeping utilization of the state secrets 
privilege runs directly counter to Justice Steven's counsel. 
More generally, there is a fundamental inconsistency between the 
privilege and the idea that the President is not "above the law" as 
well as the national commitment to the rule of law. A little more than 
two centuries after Chief Justice Marshall penned his famous opinion 
in Marbury v. Madison/63 President Barack Obama told the nation: 
In all that we do, we must remember that what sets America 
apart is not solely our power-it is the principles upon 
which our union was founded. We're a nation that brings 
our enemies to justice while adhering to the rule of law, and 
respecting the rights of all our citizens.264 
And ten months after that, in a speech at Harvard Law School, the 
General Counsel of the Central Intelligence Agency, Stephen W. 
Preston, stated that "the President has made clear that ours is a nation 
of laws, and that an abiding respect for the rule of law is one of our 
country's greatest strengths, even against an enemy with only 
contempt for the law.,,265 To emphasize that the CIA too was under 
that national mandate to be a nation committed to the rule of law, 
261. JOHN PAUL STEVENS, FIVE CHIEFS: A SUPREME COURT MEMOIR 114 (2011). See supra 
note 24 for the critical commentary on the state secrets doctrine. 
262. STEVENS, supra note 261, at 114. 
263. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
264. Press Release, President Barack H. Obama, Statement by the President on the Way 
Forward in Afghanistan (June 22, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/20 11 106/22Iremarks-president-way-forward-afghanistan. 
265. Stephen W. Preston, Gen. Counsel, Cent. Intel. Agency, CIA and the Rule of Law, 
Speech at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10,2012), in 6 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'y 1, 
1 (2012). 
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Preston stated that "This is so for the Central Intelligence Agency no 
less than any other instrument of national power engaged in the fight 
against al Qaeda and its militant allies," and that the "CIA is an 
institution of laws, and the rule of law is integral to Agency 
operations. ,,266 
Over decades the Supreme Court translated these ideals into legal 
norms. Thus, the Court has ruled that evidence obtained by an 
unconstitutional search must be suppressed in criminal cases, even if 
that results in the release of the criminal, on the ground that 
"[n]othing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to 
observe its own laws .... ,,267 Similarly, the Court ruled that a 
defendant must be given "Miranda Rights" and that a confession 
must be suppressed if not procured in compliance with the Miranda 
rules.268 The Court also requires the state to provide a lawyer to an 
indigent charged with a felony at the state's expense to give meaning 
to the ideal of the rule of law.269 In civil cases, the Court provides a 
remedy against state and local officials, as well as private parties, 
acting under color of law, for the deprivation of federal rights.270 The 
Court has fashioned a remedy against federal officials that deters 
future conduct that violates individual constitutional rights, because, 
as Justice Harlan wrote: "[I]t is important, in a civilized society, that 
the judicial branch of the Nation's government stand ready to afford a 
remedy in these circumstances.,,27! 
The state secrets privilege stands in contradiction to this tradition, 
and its use threatens to undermine the legitimacy not only of the 
courts but the Executive.272 Indeed, both governmental branches' 
266. ld. 
267. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961). In an earlier opinion, Justice Brandeis 
wrote: "Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example . . .. If the government becomes a 
lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto 
himself; it invites anarchy." Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
268. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444-45 (1966). 
269. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963). 
270. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. 
Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978) ("[I]nsofar as it holds that 
local governments are wholly immune from suit under § 1983."). 
271. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 
411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18-20 (1980); 
Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 233-34 (1979). 
272. See Limits of National Security Litigation, supra note 22, at 1252 (examining the lack 
of published opinions involving allegations of government misconduct where the 
privilege has been employed). 
2014 The Courts and National Security 81 
reluctance to rely on the privilege seems to signal recognition of the 
privilege's corrosive effect.273 
III. RESTRUCTURING THE PRIVILEGE 
Before reviewing recommended guidelines for restructuring the 
privilege, it is important to emphasize that it is entirely possible for 
courts to be responsibly deferential to the Executive without 
becoming a "rubberstamp,,274 for executive judgments and without 
supplanting executive judgments supported by concrete evidence and 
reasonable considerations. That is so because the concept of judicial 
deference is elastic and fluid and the various constructs of deference 
fall out along a spectrum that runs from extreme deference to no 
deference with many reasonable stopping points in between.275 The 
guidelines set forth below for restructuring the privilege are intended 
to define a state secrets privilege courts may enforce without being 
inappropriately deferential or intrusive.276 
A. Defining the Scope of the Privilege 
The current rules guiding the privilege have vested the Executive 
with de facto absolute authority to decide what information should be 
covered by the privilege.277 If the privilege is to be brought under 
responsible judicial authority, judges must define the phrase "state 
secrets," and that definition should include three elements. 
273. See Chesney, supra note 22, at 1315-32 (outlining published opinions adjudicating 
assertions of the privilege post-Reynolds). 
274. ld at 1377 (quoting Judge Harry Pregerson in an argument before the Ninth Circuit in 
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 539 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2008». 
275. Although this approach to the idea of deference may be obvious, it is not always 
acknowledged. Thus, even a highly respected scholar is capable oftuming the elastic 
concept of deference into an either/or dichotomy-that is, a court is either deferential 
or it is not deferential. See id at 1363 ("Ultimately, I conclude that many arguments in 
favor of deference are unpersuasive, but that deference nonetheless may be justified in 
limited circumstances."). 
276. On September 23, 2009, the Obama Administration announced new "Policies and 
Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege" that would be 
administered by the Department of Justice. See Memorandum for Heads of Executive 
Departments and Agencies, Memorandum for the Heads of Department Components, 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GEN. (Sept. 23, 2009), 
http;llwww.justice.gov/opaidocuments/state-secret-privileges.pdf. The initiative 
effectively acknowledges the abuse of the privilege and the need for the Executive to 
impose some control over its invocation in the courts. As constructive as that step is, 
the new policies do not change the rules and procedures courts follow in adjudicating 
conflicting claims over the Executive's assertion of the privilege in a particular case. 
277. See WILLS, supra note 2, at 138. 
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First, the definition must address what kind of information 
constitutes a state secret. 278 A state secret should protect information 
such as the development and location of weapons, the location of 
troops, bases and military equipment, current military contingency 
plans, important on-going intelligence operations and methods of 
securing intelligence, and current diplomatic relations pertaining to 
significant national security matters.279 In contrast, the term state 
secret should not privilege information merely because it is 
classified,280 discloses information that would be embarrassing to a 
department, agency or one or more officials,281 discloses conduct by 
executive branch officials that violated federal criminal law, or 
discloses information that would create an alleged risk of injury to 
the nation's security where that risk is insignificant, improbable and 
unlikely to occur in the foreseeable future.282 
Second, the privilege should be sustained only when evidence 
establishes that there is at least a reasonable possibility, given all of 
the relevant considerations, that the threatened disclosure will in fact 
result in the predicted injury.283 Such a linkage may seem obvious, 
but current case law permits sustaining the privilege without any 
finding regarding the probability that the alleged injury will in fact 
result from the threatened disclosure.284 
278. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953) (explaining that information 
should be protected when "there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the 
evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, 
should not be divulged."). 
279. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 305 (4th Cir. 2007); MORTON H. 
HALPERIN & DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, Top SECRET: NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE RIGHT 
TO KNow 34 (1977). 
280. Many reports have criticized the practice of over-classification by the federal 
government. See WILLS, supra note 2; DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998); HALPERIN & HOFFMAN, supra note 279. The result of 
this practice is that many documents are classified as confidential, secret, or top-
secret, even though they contain no information that bears on national security. 
Moreover, the classification system has been criticized because of the enormous delay 
in declassifying documents that perhaps should never have been classified in the first 
place. Consequently, tying the state secrets privilege to the classification system 
would lead to a wholesale application of the privilege, which would not be justified. 
281. The prime example of using the state secrets privilege to keep confidential documents 
that would otherwise embarrass the Executive is Reynolds. See generally Rudenstine, 
supra note 3, at 1285 (examining the implications of the Reynolds decision). 
282. See WILLS, supra note 2, at 139. 
283. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1081 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
bane). 
284. Id.; El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 307. 
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Third, the privilege should be sustained only when evidence 
establishes that the disclosure of the information will cause the 
predicted injury within the foreseeable future as opposed to some 
undetermined, remote, and indefinite time in the distant future.285 
Presently, there is no such requirement.286 
B. Reviewing Disputed Documents 
In cases in which documents are alleged to contain state secrets, 
courts should review the actual documents in dispute-as opposed to 
an affidavit summarizing them-to guard against what Chief Justice 
Vinson termed executive "caprice"-a caprice dramatically 
illustrated in the Reynolds case itsel[.Z87 Such a change in procedure 
requires discarding the rule set forth in the Reynolds case288 because 
under that rule, as a practical matter, a judge will rarely if ever review 
a disputed document to assess the legitimacy of the Executive 
Branch's claim that it falls within the privilege?89 
Many unpersuasive arguments are offered in support of the idea 
that judges should review only a summary of the documents in 
dispute, as opposed to the documents themselves.29o First, it is feared 
that a judge, or someone in the judge's chambers or the courthouse, 
will intentionally or inadvertently disclose a sensitive document.291 
While such a security breach is conceivable, diligent research has 
disclosed no instance of such an improper disclosure.292 Second, 
285. See United States v. Reynolds 345 U.S. I, 10 (1953). 
286. See supra Part I; supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text. 
287. Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10. 
288. That rule provides that a court should sustain the executive branch's claim of privilege 
without forcing the actual disclosure of the disputed information to a judge when that 
judge is able to conclude from the overall circumstances of the case that there is a 
reasonable danger that the disputed information contains a state secret that would, if 
publicly disclosed, injure the nation's security. Id. 
289. Id. ("[T]he court should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is me'ant to 
protect by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge alone, in 
chambers."). 
290. See id. at 8 ("Too much judicial inquiry into the claim of privilege would force 
disclosure of the thing the privilege was meant to protect .... "). 
291. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
292. See Examining the State Secret's Privilege: Protecting National Security While 
Preserving Accountability: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, IIOth Congo 
5 (2008) (statement of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy) (quoting statement submitted by 
William Webster) ("[A]s a former Federal judge, I can confirm that judges can, and 
should, be trusted with sensitive information. They are fully competent to perform an 
independent review of executive branch assertions of the state secrets privilege."). In 
contrast, improper disclosures by members of the executive branch are frequent. 
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there was once a concern that courthouses lacked the facilities to 
retain top-secret documents.293 But that consideration seems no 
longer valid since federal judges routinely review sensItIve 
documents in criminal cases294 and in Freedom of Information Act 
cases.295 Third, it is claimed that in camera, ex parte disclosure of 
disputed documents to a judge will prompt the opposing party to 
insist on also having access to the documents.296 Putting aside for a 
moment whether opposing counsel should have access to a disputed 
document, the argument is unconvincing because a judge may simply 
deny the request for access and there is no reason to think that merely 
raising a claim of access will compel it.297 Indeed, it is clear that in 
some situations, judges now have access to some information not 
shared with all parties.298 
C. Opposing Counsel 
As just noted, when the Executive currently submits documents to 
a judge in support of its claim for a state secrets privilege, opposing 
David E. Pozen, The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones 
Unlawful Disclosures of Information, 127 HARV. L. REv. 512, 530 (2013). 
293. A dramatic example of the lack of security in a courthouse occurred during the 
frenetic litigation between the United States and the New York Times over the 
newspaper's publication of what became popularly known as the Pentagon Papers. 
See DAVID RUDENSTINE, THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE 
PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 112 (1996). 
294. See, e.g., Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-16 (2012). 
295. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Operational 
Files of the National Security Agency, 50 U.S.C.A. § 3 I 44(f)(I) (2012) ("[W]henever 
any person who has requested agency records under section 552 of title 5 alleges that 
the National Security Agency has withheld records improperly because of failure to 
comply with any provision of this section, judicial review shall be available under the 
terms set forth in section 552(a)(4)(B) of title 5."); see generally Christina E. Wells, 
"National Security" Information and the Freedom of Information Act, 56 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 1195, 1205-08 (2004) (discussing FOIA's de novo judicial review provision in 
regard to claims of (b)(I) exemption). 
296. The House of Lords cited a similar contention in its World War II Duncan opinion in 
support of its conclusion that a British judge should not review disputed documents in 
camera and ex parte. Duncan v. Cammell, Laird & Co., [1942] A.C. 624 (H.L.) at 
640-41 (appeal taken from Eng.). This argument obscures the reality that the 
probable alternative to judges exercising ex parte review is judges exercising no 
review at all of the disputed information. Such a stance would grant to the Executive 
sole authority for deciding what information is or is not privileged, and such an 
outcome would put the opposing party at a considerable disadvantage by comparison 
to a procedure that included ex parte judicial review of the disputed material. 
297. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, 8 & n.21 (1953) (emphasizing that the 
judge controls the trial, rather than the executive). 
298. See supra notes 294-295. 
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counsel is denied access to them?99 As a result, only a judge and the 
Executive's representatives are present at in camera proceedings.30o 
This procedure should be changed. The available evidence suggests 
that judges are extremely deferential to the Executive's judgment on 
national security matters.301 When that inclination is combined with a 
procedure in which the Executive's judgment is unchallenged by an 
adversarial process, judges generally defer to the Executive's 
j udgment. 302 The presence of opposing counsel who has secured the 
appropriate security clearances would assist judges in assessing the 
merits of the Executive's claims. The procedures used in other 
settings in which opposing counsel has access to sensitive 
information to assure against improper disclosure can be utilized here 
to safeguard confidentiality and security.303 
D. In Camera Hearing 
Under current law, when a trial judge is unable to determine from 
all the circumstances of the case that a reasonable danger exists that 
disclosure of the information in dispute would injure national 
security, that judge has the authority to conduct an ex parte 
evidentiary hearing in which a government officer testifies as to why 
a judge should sustain the asserted claim of privilege. 304 Nonetheless, 
research has identified not one case in which a judge has exercised 
that authority.305 If judges are to retain meaningful control of the 
evidence in a case, they must, in appropriate circumstances, be 
willing to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the application of the 
privilege to the information in dispute.306 
299. Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 61 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
300. Id. 
301. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2010) ("The 
Court also provided guidance on how claims of privilege should be analyzed and held 
that, under the circumstances, the district court should have sustained the privilege 
without even requiring the government to produce the report for in camera review." 
(citing United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1953))). 
302. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1395-97. 
303. The State Secrets Protection Act of 2009, S. 417, lllth Congo (1st. Sess. 2009) was 
introduced by Senator Patrick Leahy and would have permitted opposing counsel 
access to the disputed documents. 
304. Classified Information Procedures Act, 18 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012). 
305. See generally Donahue, supra note 22. 
306. Even the remarkably deferential position adopted by Chief Justice Vinson in the 
Reynolds decision left open the possibility of such a hearing. See supra Part I. 
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E. A Qualified Privilege 
The contemporary state secrets privilege is an absolute privilege.307 
Accordingly, once a judge decides from the overall context that there 
is a reasonable probability that the disputed information or document 
would endanger the national security if disclosed, the judge must 
sustain the privilege no matter how insignificant or remote the danger 
or how important the information may be to a party claiming 
injury.308 Thus, the contemporary state secrets privilege permits no 
balancing or weighing of the importance of the information to 
national security against the vindication of an individual's legal 
claims, or even to the public's interest in knowing of the Executive's 
conduct. 
The absolute character of the privilege is supported by two claims. 
First, the judiciary has made a policy decision that any threatened 
injury to national security warrants sustaining the privilege, no matter 
how important the disputed information may be to a party alleging 
serious injury.309 There is no doubt that national security must be 
protected. But the absolute character of the privilege-combined 
with the executive's de facto authority to decide what information is 
or is not covered by the privilege-permits the protection of 
information that may present only an insignificant and improbable 
threat to the nation's security. Second, the absolute character of the 
privilege seems to rest on a distrust of the judiciary'S competence to 
resolve questions implicating national security without seriously 
harming it.3IO 
However, the privilege can be qualified without harming national 
security. A party seeking access to the disputed documents or 
information could be required to establish that such documents or 
information contain evidence central to establishing liability, that the 
evidence could not be obtained in any other way,311 and that the party 
seeks the vindication of important rights. For its part, the Executive 
would have an opportunity to establish the significance of the alleged 
national security injury, and the likelihood that the injury would in 
fact follow from the disclosure and would occur within some 
307. See supra Parts I-II. 
308. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. I, \0 (1953). 
309. See supra notes 134-148 and accompanying text. 
310. See infra Part IV. 
311. The Court in Reynolds sought to justify its judgment on the assumption that the 
plaintiffs had "an available alternative, which might have given [them] the evidence to 
make out their case without forcing a showdown on the claim of privilege." 345 U.S. 
at 11. But this assumption seems extremely doubtful. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 
1375-78. 
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foreseeable time frame as opposed to some undefined moment in the 
future. In weighing these competing factors, a court would uphold 
the privilege, regardless of its significance to the injured party, if the 
government established with concrete evidence that the threatened 
injury was significant, that it would likely follow upon disclosure, 
and that it would occur within some reasonable time frame following 
disclosure. Such an approach would qualify the privilege while still 
protecting legitimate national security considerations. 
F. Restraining the Dismissal Remedy 
The "unacceptable risk" analysis requires a case to be dismissed 
before discovery is commenced or a responsive pleading is filed.312 
As already noted, that remedial approach requires judges to engage in 
predictive decision-making long before issues are sharply defined and 
the relevant evidence is inventoried.313 This is an excessively harsh 
outcome for a party alleging serious injury. In privilege cases, courts 
should not abandon their traditional and strong preference for 
deciding issues in a concrete and specific factual context, which, in 
privilege cases, would mean that courts should delay considering the 
dismissal of an action until the parties have concretely defined the 
issues in dispute and identified with some specificity the evidence 
arguably covered by the privilege.314 
G. Party Parity 
The extension of the privilege from information sought by the 
plaintiff to information sought by the defendant was consistent with 
Reynolds.315 But the burdens of the extension fell entirely on the 
312. See supra Part I1.C.I. 
313. See supra Part I1.C.1. 
314. Amanda Frost has a novel but impractical suggestion for restraining the dismissal of 
actions: "The judge could issue a stay and inform the parties that she will continue to 
abstain only if she is convinced that Congress will take back the oversight role that it 
delegated to the courts when it granted jurisdiction over cases challenging the legality 
of executive action." Frost, supra note 22, at 1963. 
315. "[B]ut in substance it is agreed that the court must be satisfied from all the evidence 
and circumstances, and 'from the implications of the question, in the setting in which 
it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot 
be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.'" 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 9 (quoting Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 
(1951)). 
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plaintife16 Surely a defendant deserves a fair day in court; but then, 
so does a plaintiff. While it would be a "mockery,,317 of justice to 
impose a judgment on a defendant in a case in which plaintiff s 
essential allegations were false, it is also a mockery of justice to 
dismiss a plaintiffs' complaint merely because a defendant may be 
hampered in establishing a valid defense.318 There are powerful 
reasons for avoiding both mockeries, but for now courts are only 
focused on protecting defendants from an injustice.319 
Judges should balance out the burdens of the privilege in two ways. 
They could reduce the hardship on the plaintiff by reforming the 
privilege so that it functioned in accord with the considerations set 
forth in this section. In privileged cases involving information 
helpful to a defendant, they could limit the dismissal remedy to cases 
in which it was evident that the allegations essential to plaintiffs' 
claims were false. In other cases, the presumption would be that the 
privileged information potentially helpful to a defendant is treated as 
if a witness had died, which would impose the burden on a defendant 
to offer a defense based on other available information. That 
presumption could be overcome, but only in unusual cases, and only 
if a judge set forth convincing reasons for imposing the burdens 
triggered by the privilege solely on the plaintiff. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES AND POSSIBILITIES OF 
RESTRUCTURING 
Given that the arguments favoring the restructuring of the state 
secrets privilege are powerful,320 and given that the privilege is 
already in disfavor,321 why is it that a dominant body of judges today 
will not restructure the state secrets privilege or modify their posture 
on deference? The explanation of this dynamic must be the character 
of the juristic mind that endorses the idea that courts should exhibit 
the "utmost deference,,322 in all matters affecting national security, 
including the state secrets privilege. 
Attempting to penetrate a juristic mind that has shaped an era of 
deference is hazardous. Such an inquiry will not portray the thinking 
316. See Molerio v. FBI, 749 F.2d 815, 824-25 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (affinning summary 
judgment against plaintiff when privileged infonnation provided a complete defense 
to plaintiffs claim). 
317. Id. at 825. 
318. See Zuckerbraun v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 935 F.2d 544, 546-47 (2d Cir. 1991). 
319. See id. at 547. 
320. See supra Part III. 
321. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text. 
322. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709-10 (1974). 
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of all judges favoring the current degree of deference, and it will not 
describe the thinking of judges who have criticized the contemporary 
state secrets privilege or the general perspective of deference. 
Nonetheless, attempting to penetrate the judicial mind that has 
generated the state secrets privilege as part of the broader Age of 
Deference is essential if the development is to be understood and the 
possibilities of change are to be appreciated. To be sure, any legal 
mindset is composed of entangled variables-precedent, values, 
pragmatic considerations, prejudices, aspirations, expectations-that 
may bleed into one another, reinforce one another, and vary over time 
and with context. 323 Thus, in seeking to disentangle the variables that 
comprise the juristic mind set of deference, some distortion may be 
committed on the integrity of the whole.324 Nonetheless, 
disentanglement is required if there IS any possibility of 
understanding the whole. 
The deferential juristic mindset has three pivotal poles. The first 
concerns judicial competence. From this perspective, judges are not 
competent to decide matters implicating national security because, as 
Justice Jackson wrote, these matters are "political, not judicial," in 
nature, they are "delicate, complex, and involve large elements of 
prophecy," and they are decisions for which the "[j]udiciary has 
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been 
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial 
intrusion or inquiry.,,325 From this vantage point, no matter how 
323. See Yao Wu & Olga Yevtukhova, Influences on Judicial Decision-Making in Federal 
and Bankruptcy Courts, SOCIAL LAW LIBRARY, available at http://socialaw.comldocs/ 
default-source/slbookljudgeyoung09/16wu-yevtukhova-paper.pdf?sfvrsn=2 (last 
visited Nov. 17,2014). 
324. See Eric Berger, Deference Determinations and Stealth Constitutional Decision 
Making, 98 IOWA L. REv. 465, 468-69 (2013). 
325. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948). The 
views that Justice Jackson expressed in his opinion for the Court in Chicago & South 
Air Lines, Inc. were in accord with those in his dissent in Korematsu v. United States, 
323 U.S. 214, 244-46 (1945). But see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953), 
rev'g 192 F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1951), in which Jackson dissented for the reasons 
expressed by the Third Circuit, 192 F.2d at 997-that is, he supported an in camera, 
ex parte review by an Article III judge of the information that the Executive asserted 
must be protected by the state secrets privilege. Most recently, Eric A. Posner's 
review of Rahul Sager's Secrets and Leaks: The Dilemma of State Secrecy (2013) is 
just one indication that the competency claim continues to be vital and current in the 
discussion of the court's role in national security cases. Eric A. Posner, Before You 
Reboot the NSA, Think About This: The Paradox of Secrecy, THE NEW REpUBLIC 
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.comlarticleI1152911rahul-sagars-secret-
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much evidence is presented, how many experts testify, or how many 
days a hearing may last, judges will lack a broad perspective 
seasoned by years of experience, and, as a result, judges will, through 
no fault of trying or effort or intelligence, simply not be competent, 
as Jackson wrote, to "review and perhaps nullify" a decision made by 
members of the executive branch.326 
No one quarrels with the claim that the Constitution allocates to the 
Executive and Congress primary responsibility for the nation's 
security. But primary responsibility is not exclusive responsibility 
and the competency claim is so open-ended it could apply just as 
easily to other cases that the court has in fact decided that affect 
important, substantive aspects of American life-such as the 
economy,327 health care,328 and scientific stud~29-similarly 
obscuring them from judicial review. Moreover, the claim that 
competency--or, to be more precise, incompetency-should disable 
judges in national security cases is not descriptive ofhistory.33o Thus, 
in some landmark national security cases, federal judges have 
leaks-reviewed-eric-posner ("Judges have pled time and again that they lack the 
training and knowledge to second-guess soldiers and spies."). 
326. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc., 333 U.S. at III; see generally Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507, 582-84 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]he courts simply lack the relevant 
expertise to second-guess determinations made by the President based on information 
properly withheld."); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 757-58 (1971) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[T]he judiciary may not properly go beyond these two 
inquiries and redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national 
security."); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 708-10 (1952) (Vinson, c.J., dissenting) ("A 
sturdy judiciary should not be swayed by the unpleasantness or unpopularity of 
necessary executive action, but must independently determine for itself whether the 
President was acting, as required by the Constitution, to 'take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed. "'). 
327. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,36-38 (1937). 
328. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579-80 (2012) (discussing 
the constitutionalitY of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act). 
329. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2111 (2013) 
(discussing the validity of patents for isolated DNA sequences associated with 
predisposition to certain cancers and for diagnostic methods of identifying mutations 
in those DNA sequences). 
330. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008) ("The Government presents no 
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if 
habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees' claims."); United States v. 
United States Dist. Court for the E. Dist. Of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972) 
("We cannot accept the Government's argument that internal security matters are too 
subtle and complex for judicial evaluation."). Even the Supreme Court's decision in 
United States v. Reynolds did not close the door on a federal judge reviewing 
classified and highly sensitive documents. 345 U.S. 1,6-10 (1953). 
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exercised meaningful review, and by so doing have contributed to the 
prestige and legitimacy of the courts.331 
Consider the Steel Seizure Case332 of 1952. Faced with the 
possibility of a union strike that would shut the nation's steel mills, 
President Truman directed his Secretary of Commerce to take 
possession of and operate most of the mills on the basis that a strike 
would "jeopardize . . . national defense," in that steel was an 
indispensable component of "substantially all weapons and other war 
materials" required in the ongoing Korean War.333 After the Supreme 
Court ruled that President Truman's seizure was unconstitutional, "a 
53-day steel strike ensued ... and no steel shortage occurred."334 
Though the legal issue presented did not require the Court to decide 
the direct question-namely, whether a strike would or would not 
result in a shortage of steel and have immediate consequences for the 
United States service units in Korea335-it seems naIve to imagine 
that the six members of the majority did not assess that factor as part 
of the process of deciding the case. 
Consider also the celebrated Pentagon Papers case in which the 
Nixon Administration claimed that the continued publication by the 
New York Times and the Washington Post of excerpts from a "Top 
Secret-Sensitive" Pentagon-sponsored history of the United States 
involvement in Vietnam from World War II to 1968 would seriously 
harm national security.336 After reviewing the evidence, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the administration had not satisfied its "heavy" 
evidentiary burden and refused to grant a prior restraint.337 Years 
later, Erwin Griswold, the Solicitor General who argued the 
government's appeal in the case, stated that the newspapers' 
publication of the Pentagon Papers excerpts caused no harm to the 
nation's security.338 
331. See supra, text accompanying notes 245-248. 
332. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
333. Id. at 582-83, 590. 
334. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 306 (18th ed. 
2013). 
335. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 582-84. 
336. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717-18 (1971). 
337. Id. 
338. See RUDENSTlNE, supra note 293 for a thorough history of the Pentagon Papers case. 
For recent national security cases in which the Court asserted its independence and 
ruled against the Executive, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); and Rasul 
v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). See David Rudenstine, American Preeminence, 
Separation of Power and Human Rights: The Guantanamo Detainee Case, in 
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Second, it is claimed that courts should defer in national security 
cases because the issues are of such importance that courts must 
stand aside and let the Executive and Legislative Branches, which are 
politically accountable, govern without judicial oversight.339 Similar 
to the claim of competence, this claim is undermined by its sweeping 
character. Courts routinely decide many matters of high significance 
to the nation-such as same-sex marriage, abortion, affirmative 
action, the right to die, health care, voting rights and campaign 
financing;340 it is hardly obvious that courts should be disabled by the 
political accountability argument only in national security matters. 
Moreover, because national security matters vary greatly in 
importance, it is unconvincing to claim that courts should defer to the 
Executive in all national security matters merely because they 
possibly should in rare cases. 
Furthermore, the political unaccountability charge against courts is 
simplistic to a fault. Courts are hardly immune from political and 
popular influences.341 Congress has substantial control over the 
jurisdiction of the COurtS/42 the Executive influences the direction of 
the courts through the appointment of judges,343 and there is 
substantial evidence indicating that over time public opinion has a 
shaping influence on judicial outcomes.344 The implication that 
GUANTANAMO BAY AND THE JUDICIAL-MORAL TREATMENT OF THE OTHER 15 (Clark 
Butler ed., 2007) (highlighting the break with the tradition of deference that the 
Hamdi and Rasul cases represented) [hereinafter American Preeminence, Separation 
of Power and Human Rights]. 
339. See American Preeminence, Separation of Power and Human Rights, supra note 338, 
at 23. 
340. At least one jurist, however, advocates deference even in these cases. See David 
Rudenstine, Self-Government and the Judicial Function, 92 TEX. L. REv. 161, 161-62 
(2013) (reviewing J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (Oxford 
University Press 2012)). 
341. Id. at 195 & nn.290-91. 
342. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 573-75 (2006); Ex Parte 
McCardle, 74 U.S. 506,512-14 (1868). 
343. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Charles M. Blow of the New York Times recently 
highlighted the composition of the United States Supreme Court by the political party 
of the President who nominated each member of the Court. Among his interesting 
findings, his statistics indicated that from 1976 to 2008 the Court membership 
consisted at anyone time of no less than seven members appointed by a Republican 
president. In his column, Blow wrote that appointment of federal judges "is where a 
president can exert power long after he has officially faded from power." Charles M. 
Blow, Court Fight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1,2013), http://www.nytimes.comJ2013/11102/ 
opinionlblow-court-fight.html. 
344. See generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS 
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 
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courts are politically insulated suggests that the Executive and the 
administrative agencies and departments that comprise the national 
security state are at the opposite end of the accountability spectrum 
and are highly politically accountable. But that is surely not so. A 
second-term president holds office on the legitimacy of the past 
presidential election but is no longer politically accountable.345 More 
strikingly, the numerous departments and agencies directly 
responsible for national security function mainly in secret.346 Thus, 
the National Security Council, CIA, National Security Agency, and 
intelligence agencies within the Pentagon function in secref47 and 
have only limited accountability to Congress-and then, only to a 
few members on select committees-and almost no accountability to 
the public.348 Once the political accountability claim is placed in this 
(2009) (chronicling the history of the link between public opinion and judicial 
review). 
345. U.S. CaNST. amend. XXII. 
346. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (ruling that an individual 
who sought disclosure of the CIA budget under the "Statement and Account" Clause 
of the Constitution was not entitled to information that precisely detailed CIA 
expenditures). 
347. Although the Constitution states that, "a regular statement and account of the receipts 
and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time," U.S. 
CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 7, the CIA's budget is secret. See Richardson, 418 U.S. at 168-
69, 175. Thus, the voting public learns about CIA expenditures only when the 
Executive makes such expenditures public or when a government official makes an 
unauthorized disclosure, as was very recently done regarding the "bags" of cash the 
CIA leaves in the office of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. See Matthew Rosenberg, 
With Bags of Cash, C.I.A. Seeks Influence in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.coml20 13/04/29/woridlasialcia-delivers-cash-to-afghan-
leaders-office.html; see also Chesney, supra note 22, at 1430-31 (referencing the 
undemocratic nature of the "the decisionmaking role of the Administrative Review 
Board (ARB) mechanism for Gmintanamo detainees .... [T]he nature of the ARB's 
composition ... and the non-transparent nature of its work . . . call into question 
whether there is a meaningful nexus between ARB decisions and democratic 
accountability. "). 
348. Unauthorized disclosures by government employees-so-called "Ieaks"-are a staple 
of national security reporting. Indeed, some even maintain that because of the 
enormous net cast by the United States classification system there would be no 
meaningful national security reporting absent unauthorized disclosures. Max Frankel, 
Where Did Our 'Inalienable Rights' Go?, N.Y. TiMES (June 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.coml2013/06/23/opinionlsunday/where-did-our-inalienable-
rights-go.html; Andrew Beaujon, Jill Abramson: Leak Prosecutions Threaten to 'Rob 
the Public of Vital Information,' POYNTER (June 18, 2012, 8:57 AM), 
http://www.poynter.orgllatest-news/mediawire/I77554/jill-abramson-Ieak-
prosecutions-threaten-to-rob-the-public-of-vital-informationl; Arthur S. Brisbane, 
National Secrets and National Security, N.Y. TiMES (June 16, 2012), 
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light, the merits of the claim can be turned on their head for it is 
highly plausible that the public nature of judicial proceedings would 
make national security policies and operations more transparent. 
The third cluster of considerations asserted in support of judicial 
deference revolves around the idea that the protection of national 
security trumps all other interests. 349 Underlying this perspective is a 
conception of national security that emphasizes current, narrowly 
construed security interests over a broader conception of security 
with long-term implications. 
Several considerations undermine this perspective. First, there is 
simply no evidence that an alteration of the deferential judicial stance 
in cases implicating national security will increase the risk of national 
danger. Indeed, as noted, in cases in which federal judges have 
exercised meaningful judicial review, they have impressively 
acquitted themselves.35o Second, there is reason to believe that 
curbing judicial deference may enhance the nation's security because 
the expectation of more meaningful judicial oversight might cause 
the Executive to proceed with deliberateness, which may result in 
http://www.nytimes.coml20 12/06/1 71 opinionlsunday/national-secrets-and-national-
security.htm\. For an historic statement of the importance of unauthorized disclosures 
in informing the American public about national security matters, see the affidavit of 
Max Frankel, dated June 17, 1971, filed in the Pentagon Papers case, in which he 
stated: 
Without the use of "secrets" that I shall attempt to explain in this 
affidavit, there could be no adequate diplomatic, military and 
political reporting of the kind our people take for granted, either 
abroad or in Washington and there could be no mature system of 
communication between the Government and the people. 
Affidavit of Max Frankel at ~ 4, United States v. N.Y. Times, 328 F. Supp. 324 
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (No. 71 Civ. 2662), 1971 WL 224067. In that regard, the Obama 
Administration has initiated "an aggressive focus on leaks and leakers that has led to 
more than twice as many prosecutions as there were in all previous administrations 
combined." Sharon LaFraniere, Math Behind Leak Crackdown: 153 Cases, 4 Years, 0 
Indictments, N.Y. TiMES (July 20,2013), http://www.nytimes.coml2013/07/211us/ 
politics/math-behind-Ieak -crackdown-IS 3-cases-4-years-0-indictments.html. 
349. See, e.g., Marcus Eyth, The CIA and Covert Operations: To Disclose or Not to 
Disclose-That is the Question, 17 BYU J. PUB. L. 45, 71 (2002). Chief Justice 
Rehnquist raised this consideration in Tenet v. Doe: 
The state secrets privilege and the more frequent use of in camera 
judicial proceedings simply cannot provide the absolute protection 
we found necessary in enunciating the Totten rule. The possibility 
that a suit may proceed and an espionage relationship may be 
revealed, if the state secrets privilege is found not to apply, is 
unacceptable. 
544 U.S. 1, 11 (2005). 
350. See supra notes 15, 325-38 and accompanying text. 
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wiser decisions in the long term.351 Third, the Executive demand for 
judicial deference rests in part on the assumption that security 
depends solely on the military front lines- front lines that are 
defined by elusive non-state actors.352 This outlook overlooks the 
importance of what is often termed "soft-power," which emphasizes 
factors that greatly contribute to America's standing in the world, 
such as the freedom of American private and public institutions, the 
scope of individual liberties, and the rule of law. 353 
CONCLUSION 
In retrospect, the Executive's claims for an expansive construction 
of the state secrets privilege may be dispiriting, but it is not 
surprising. Indeed, given the constitutional structure of the national 
government and what might be thought of as the constitutional 
invitation for the three branches to compete for authority and power, 
it should be expected that the President, who is Commander-in-Chief 
and dominates in national security matters, will continually assert 
authority and press the other two co-equal branches to cede to its 
requests and demands for more and more unilateral authority. 
At the same time, it is disappointing that the Supreme Court has 
failed to wend its way through the thicket so as to simultaneously 
respect Executive and Congressional responsibilities to protect the 
national security, and to not surrender so completely its own 
independence and its responsibility to provide a meaningful check on 
Executive power. But that is what the Supreme Court has done. For 
decades, it has endorsed a robust and sweeping state secrets privilege 
and even recently-without one member of the Court breaking ranks 
and criticizing the Court's disposition-reaffirmed its long-standing 
refusal to reconsider the scope of the privilege.354 
The fact that the high court's attitude toward the privilege seems so 
impenetrable to change, especially given that the privilege is so 
351. See SHANE, supra note 15. 
352. See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). 
353. See generally JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD 
POLITICS 6 (2004). President Barack Obama recently acknowledged this basic political 
tenet in a speech at the National Defense University: "So America is at a crossroads. 
We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We 
have to be mindful of James Madison's warning that 'No nation could preserve its 
freedom in the midst of continual warfare. '" President Barack Obama, Remarks by 
the President at the National Defense University, WHITEHouSE.GOV (May 23, 2013), 
http://www. whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/20 13/05123/remarks-president -national-
defense-university. 
354. See Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900, 1906-07 (20 II). 
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convincingly criticized, is best understood as a manifestation of the 
Age of Deference.355 For decades, the Supreme Court has adopted a 
hands-off attitude toward the Executive in national security cases,356 
and while there are notable exceptions to this pattern, those 
exceptions remain just that--exceptions.357 The general rule is one of 
deference, and while the past suggests that now and then a majority 
of justices will break ranks with tradition, all signals indicate that no 
one currently on the Court will challenge the general rule of 
deference in the near future. As a result, there is little reason to 
expect that the Court will any time soon revise the privilege, and 
moreover, even if the Court did revise the privilege, absent a 
substantial shift in the Court's deferential disposition, the balloon 
effect created by the cluster of doctrines that comprise the Age of 
Deference would sharply minimize the importance of the 
restructuring. 
This is a deeply regrettable state of affairs. And although no one 
claims that the expanded privilege will "plunge us straightway," as 
Justice Jackson wrote in another context, "into dictatorship ... it is at 
least a step in that wrong direction.,,358 And because, as Jackson also 
wrote, "men have discovered no technique for long preserving free 
government except that the Executive be under the law," although it 
may well be that free government "may be destined to pass away . . . 
it is the duty of the Court to be last, not first, to give [it] Up.,,359 
Perhaps in time individual justices on the Supreme Court will 
reconsider the Court's deferential disposition in national security 
cases, and write opinions that chart a new course-a course in which 
the Court functions as a third co-equal and independent branch of 
government that provides meaningful judicial review of Executive 
policies and conduct, even in cases implicating national security. 
355. See Rudenstine, supra note 3, at 1287. 
356. See supra notes 6 & 13. 
357. See supra note 15. 
358. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
359. Id at 655. 
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APPENDICES 
Methodology 
The three appendices illustrate the rate at which citations to United 
States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953) have appeared in federal court 
decisions and law review articles over time (the "intensity" of 
citations to Reynolds). A decision or article is only counted once, 
regardless of how many times it mentions Reynolds; no distinction is 
made between decisions and articles that merely mention Reynolds, 
and those that explore it in great detail. Data for the graphs was 
collected using the KeyCite function on WestlawNext, an "up-to-the-
minute citation service" which enables users to retrieve citing 
references and is available via a toolbar above every document 
accessed on WestlawNext, including Reynolds.360 More specifically, 
the KeyCite feature for "Viewing Citing References for a Case" 
(called "Citing References" on the KeyCite toolbar) was used to 
generate lists of decisions and articles. Each list was then exported to 
Microsoft Excel, sorted by date of decision/publication, and tallied to 
provide the data for the tables in the appendices. 
The lists that provided the data for Appendices 1 and 3 were 
generated by narrowing the Citing References to display only court 
decisions (called "Cases" in the section of the sidebar labeled 
"View"). The Citing References were narrowed further to display 
only decisions from federal District Courts (Table 1, Appendix 1), 
Courts of Appeae61 (Table 2, Appendix 1), and the Supreme Court 
(Table 1, Appendix 3). This further narrowing was accomplished by 
selecting the appropriate checkbox in the sidebar labeled 
"Jurisdiction." 
The list that provided the data for Appendix 2 was generated by 
narrowing the Citing References to display only "Secondary Sources" 
(in the section of the sidebar labeled "View"), which were then 
narrowed further to display only "Law Reviews" (also in the "View" 
section). 
Court decisions and law review articles that were 
decided/published after 2013, are not reflected in the appendices. 
360. KeyCite on Westlaw Next, THOMPSON REUTERS (2012), 
https:llinfo.legalsolutions.thomsomeuters.comlpdf/wln21L-356347.pdf. 
361. In addition to the Circuit Courts, this includes one decision by the Temporary 
Emergency Court of Appeals. 
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Appendix 1 
Table 1 
Intensity of District Court Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013 
Table 2 
Intensity of Circuit Court Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013 
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Appendix 2 
Table 3 
Intensity of Law Review Citations to Reynolds from 1953 to 2013 





Gen. Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 (2011). 
2000-2009 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 




United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989). 
Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988). 
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1 (1988). 
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988). 
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858 (1982). 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw.lPeace Educ. Project, 454 U.S. 139 
(1981). 
Vol. 44 
2014 The Courts and National Security 
1970-1979 
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 
Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for N. Dist. of Cal., 426 U.S. 394 (1976). 
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
Envt!. Prot. Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972). 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972). 
Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972). 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
1960-1969 
Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). 
1950-1959 
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). 
Notes to Appendix 3 
The Court has only considered the state secrets privilege and Reynolds on 
rare occasions. In these instances, the Court has never explicitly expanded 
Reynolds beyond its original scope. While the Court does apply Reynolds 
to new circumstances, the pure holding of the case does not seem to be 
disturbed. General Dynamics Corp. v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1900 
(2011), is the only case in which the Court seems to be mildly cautioning 
courts on the use of the privilege, declaring that the "privilege 'is not to be 
lightly invoked, ", and that "[ c ]ourts should be even more hesitant to 
declare a Government contract unenforceable because of state secrets. It 
is the option of last resort, available in a very narrow set of 
circumstances." Id. at 1910 (citation omitted). In General Dynamics, 
Justice Scalia held that when the state secrets privilege is invoked to 
dismiss a government contractor's prima facie valid "superior knowledge" 
affirmative defense to the government's allegations of contractual breach, 
the proper remedy is to leave the parties where they were on the day that 
they filed suit. /d. at 1902. Justice Scalia noted that the proper state 
secrets jurisprudence does not arise from Reynolds but from Totten v. 
United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875) and Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005). 
/d. at 1906. This is because Reynolds deals with "a Government privilege 
against court-ordered disclosure of state and military secrets," while 
Totten and Tenet deal with "alleged contracts to spy." Id. at 1905-06. 
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 715 (1974), the Court briefly but 
meaningfully discussed the states secrets privilege holding that it was "in 
the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest 
protection consistent with the fair administration of justice." Further, in 
regard to Presidential privilege, in Nixon v. Adm 'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 
425 (1977), Justice Brennan discusses presidential privilege and 
101 
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confidentiality for a fonner president. Relying on Reynolds, the Court 
contended that, "only an incumbent President can assert the privilege of 
the Presidency." Id. at 448. The privilege belongs to the Government and 
must be asserted by it, it can neither be claimed nor waived by a private 
party. Id. A fonner president is less in need of the privilege than an 
incumbent, and also there are "obvious political checks against an 
incumbent's abuse of the privilege." Id. 
Even when a case meaningfully discussed Reynolds, state secrets was not 
always the topic per se. For instance, in Kerr v. u.s. Dist. Court for N. 
Dist. of Cal. , 426 U.S. 394 (1976), Justice Marshall was primarily 
concerned with whether documents from a prison could be disclosed when 
prisoners filed a class action against the California Department of 
Correction. The Court affinned the Court of Appeals decision, which 
discussed Reynolds and proposed that "in camera review is a highly 
appropriate and useful means of dealing with claims of governmental 
privilege." Id. at 406. 
The Court in United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989), in an opinion by 
Justice Blackmun, also relied on Reynolds for its elucidation of in camera 
review. Quoting Reynolds, Blackmun recognized that '''examination of 
the evidence, even by the judge alone, in chambers' might in some cases 
'jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect. '" Id. at 
570 (citation omitted). The Zolin Court agreed with the assertion in 
Reynolds that "some compromise" between too much judicial inquiry and 
a complete abandonment of judicial control "must be reached." Id. at 571. 
The Court then attempted to fashion a standard for when in camera review 
would be appropriate, and relied on Caldwell v. Dist. Court, 644 P.2d 26, 
33 (Colo. 1982) for its result. 
In Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1 (2005), the Court primarily grapples with the 
Totten rule, but points out that Reynolds "cannot plausibly be read to have 
replaced the categorical Totten bar with the balancing of the state secrets 
evidentiary privilege in the distinct class of cases that depend upon 
clandestine spy relationships." !d. at 9-10. 
Most of the court cases that cite to Reyonds are brief and perfunctory. In 
some of the cases, there is only one citation to Reynolds and no expansive 
discussion on the case. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C., 542 U.S. 
367,389 (2004); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 604 (1988); U.S. Dep't of 
Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. 1, 13 (1988). In Weinberger v. Catholic Action 
of Hawaii/Peace Education Project, 454 U.S. 139, 147 (1981), the Court 
claims to be "confront[ing] a similar situation" to Reynolds, however, it 
only cites to Reynolds once. In Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 
410 U.S. 73 (1973), the Court only weakly relies on Reynolds and 
proposes that: 
in the absence of a claim that disclosure would jeopardize state 
secrets, memoranda consisting only of compiled factual material or 
purely factual material contained in deliberative memoranda and 
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severable from its context would generally be available for discovery 
by private parties in litigation with the Government. 
Id. at 87-88 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). 
In one instance, Reynolds is included within a string of citations. See 
Dep't of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518,527 (1988). In two instances, 
Reynolds is cited to as a "cf." or "compare to" citation. See Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 796 (2008); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 
U.S. 713, 757 (1971). Other times, Reynolds is only mentioned in a 
footnote. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 n.35 (1982); Gelbard 
v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 44 n.3 (1972); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 
U.S. 665, 738 n.25 (1972); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,645 
n.ll (1972). The Court has also cited to Reynolds in dicta. See Alderman 
v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 199 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (stating he would "go even further" than the Court 
in Reynolds and "lay upon trial judges the affirmative duty of assuring 
themselves that the national security interests claimed to justify an in 
camera proceeding are real and not merely colorable"). In a defamation 
case, Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 196 (1979), the Court cites to 
Reynolds, stating that a "general statement of need will not prevail over a 
concrete demonstration of the necessity for executive secrecy." 
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